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INTRODUCTION
Forty years after the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan reported
the results of their groundbreaking study, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination.2 Their study revealed that simply having an
African American3-sounding name significantly decreased one’s
opportunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or
industry.4 Based upon an experiment that involved sending identical,
fictitious résumés with an African American-sounding name, such as
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to . . . privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” or “to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
3. For the purposes of this Article, the terms “black” and “African American”
are used interchangeably. In particular, we use the term “African American” to refer to
specific, black-American creations such as names like Lakisha. The words “Black” and
“White” are capitalized when used as a noun to identify a racial group.
4. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 1.
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Jamal, and a white-sounding name, such as Greg, to the same employers
in Boston and Chicago, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that résumés
with white-sounding names received fifty percent more callbacks for
interviews.5 They further found that race affected employers’
perceptions of higher-quality résumés,6 with résumés containing white-
sounding names receiving thirty percent more callbacks than those with
African American-sounding names.7
The results of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s investigation raise
critical questions about the effectiveness of Title VII as a remedy for and
deterrent to race discrimination in the hiring market today,8 especially as
employment discrimination has evolved into different forms. Numerous
professors have written articles that criticize current judicial
interpretations of race discrimination under Title VII, in particular
commenting on the failure of federal courts to evaluate employment
cases in a manner that comports with the realities of racism and the
shifting faces of employment discrimination.9 As Professor Lu-in Wang
explained, current antidiscrimination law neglects the ways in which
“unconscious biases. . .can lead [people] to treat [others] differently
based on race, but without intending to or even being aware that [they]
are doing so.”10 Although blatant forms of racial discrimination still
occur in our post-Title VII world, discrimination on the job market is
generally more subtle.11 It simply is not as common for an employer to
explicitly inform a job applicant that he or she did not receive an
interview or job because of his or her race, national origin, sex, religion,
5. Id. at 1-3, 10.
6. The authors defined higher-quality résumés as those that listed more labor
market experience, had fewer holes in employment history, included some completion of
a certification degree, identified foreign language skills and awards, and had a higher
likelihood of including an e-mail address. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 3, 11-12.
8. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA . L. REV. 375, 468-69 (1995) (highlighting how
complaints to the EEOC alleging discrimination in hiring have significantly decreased
since the 1980s because of evidentiary difficulties in proving discrimination).
9. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-29 (2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV . 1161, 1174 (1995); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial
and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1134, 1166-71, 1194-99 (2004).
10. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling
Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1017 (2004); see also Frank Rudy Cooper,
Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 16, on file with authors) (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 124 (1990)) (“Forms of subordination ‘have gone underground,
dwelling in everyday habits and cultural meanings of which people are for the most part
unaware.’”); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498-1528
(2005) (analyzing cognitive psychology studies that demonstrated that study subjects
perform tasks with an unconscious bias based on race).
11. Wang, supra note 10, at 1017.
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or age.12 At the very least, employers recognize that such open
discrimination may present the threat of employment litigation for their
businesses.13
This reduction in blatant forms of bigotry, however, has not
signified an end to discrimination in the workplace.14 For example, in
many instances, employers rely on proxies for race, national origin, sex,
12. Dais v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
113 F. App’x 417 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Indeed, because an employer who discriminates is
unlikely to leave a ‘smoking gun’ attesting to its discriminatory intent, a victim of
discrimination is seldom able to prove his claim by direct evidence and is usually
constrained to rely solely on circumstantial evidence.”); see also Angela P. Harris,
Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 208
(1996) (“[T]he open espousal of racist ideology is now taboo.”); Wang, supra note 10, at
1035 (“To be sure, the discrimination of today is less likely to be as blatant or crude as
the racism of the (not so) distant past . . . .”); cf. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 151 (1992) (“We all know it is wrong to refuse to hire women as truck drivers,
to refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems from basketball teams, or to refuse to
sit next to Rastafarians at lunch counters.”).
13. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National
Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860 (1994)
(“Most employers know better than to discriminate overtly.”); see also Douglas S.
Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban
Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings, 36 URB. AFF. REV . 452, 452 (2001)
(noting that after the Fair Housing Act was passed, “outright refusals to rent to African-
Americans became rare, given that overt discrimination might lead to prosecution”).
14. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-claiming the
Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U.
PITT. L. REV. 455, 463-64 (2005) (“But, while civil rights laws have removed some
barriers and impacted some decision-making practices in some hiring and promotion
contexts, they have done little to address de facto discrimination.”). In addition to
Bertrand and Mullainathan’s work, another recent study, where black and white college
students posed as job applicant testers for 350 employers in the Milwaukee area, found
that Whites who admitted to having served eighteen months in prison for a drug
possession conviction received callbacks seventeen percent of the time, whereas crime-
free Blacks received callbacks only fourteen percent of the time. See Devah Pager, The
Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. OF SOC. 937, 950-51, 955-57 (2003); see also
David Wessel, Racial Discrimination: Still at Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at A2,
available at http://www.careerjounal.com/myc/diverse/20030916-wessel.html (discussing
Pager’s study and the Bertrand and Mullainathan study and contrasting their results with
Gallup poll results showing that fifty-five percent of Whites, but only seventeen percent
of Blacks, believe minorities have the same job opportunities as Whites). In an earlier
study, scholars Marc Bendick, Charles Jackson, and Victor Reinoso compiled data from
the Fair Employment Council (“FEC”) of Greater Washington, Inc., the University of
Colorado, and the Urban Institute (“UI”), which each sent testers of different races but
with nearly identical résumés to apply for jobs in markets in Chicago, Denver, San
Diego, and Washington, D.C. Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment
Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments, 23 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 25, 27-
29 (1994). The study found that discrimination—described to exist where the minority
was treated worse than the white partner in the testing pair—negatively affected African
American testers twenty-four percent of the time, and Latinos twenty-two percent of the
time (for FEC testers) and twenty percent of the time (for UI testers). Id. at 29-31 tbls.1
& 2. One very significant result was that for the Latino and white tester pairs in the UI
data—where Latinos were negatively affected by discrimination twenty percent of the
time—the study used either résumés or phone calls, rather than live inquiries, to apply for
positions in San Diego and Chicago. See id. at 30 tbl.1.
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religion, or age to exclude an applicant as a job contender or to
discriminate against an employee in another manner. Indeed, numerous
plaintiffs over the age of forty have filed age discrimination lawsuits
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),15
alleging that they were terminated from their jobs because of the
potential value of their pensions if vested and their employers’ desire to
avoid the costs of honoring such pensions, a factor that correlates highly
with age.16 As a general matter, federal courts have denied these claims,
reasoning that such discrimination is not based on an impermissible
factor under the ADEA. According to these courts, discrimination based
on pensions or other like factors is just that, discrimination based on
those factors, and not illegal discrimination based on a forbidden trait.17
Indeed, although race discrimination differs from age discrimination in
several significant ways,18 federal courts have also held, in the very few
cases addressing the issue, that proxy discrimination based on factors
that correlate highly with race cannot be remedied under Title VII.19
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age”). Significantly, like Title VII with regard
to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, the ADEA seeks to prevent discrimination
“because of” an individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. s 623(a)(1) (2000).
16. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 606-07 (1993); cf.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590-600 (2004) (rejecting
“reverse” age discrimination claims of older workers who asserted that changes to
company’s health and retirement benefits plans favored older workers over younger
workers).
17. See, e.g. , Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 608-11.
18. See Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other:
Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
839, 842-51 (2003) (describing some of the dissimilarities between discrimination against
people of color and discrimination against older workers); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Kimel Court raised a difference between age and race
discrimination when it remarked “[o]lder persons, again, unlike those who suffer
discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have not been subjected to a ‘history of
purposeful unequal treatment.’” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d
183, 193 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 2, 6 (1965), reprinted
in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 16
(1981)) (detailing how age discrimination differs from race discrimination, including the
fact that age prejudice, unlike race prejudice, is distinct “because the process of aging ‘is
inescapable, affecting everyone who lives long enough,’ regardless of distinct social and
economic environments”).
19. See, e.g. , McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779,
at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996); cf. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 375 (1991)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“No matter how closely tied or significantly
correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”). Outside the context of
Title VII cases, courts have recognized that names are unlawfully used as a proxy for
national origin and race. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 491, 499-503 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding that the conduct of INS agents was without a rational basis and violative
of the Fourth Amendment where the agents’ only basis for investigation and seizure of
the petitioner was his “Nigerian-sounding name”); Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540
5
Outside of the context of age discrimination and, to some extent,
national origin discrimination, very few scholars have examined the
problem of proxy discrimination.20 Although some scholars have
explored the dangers in using race as a proxy for work-related criteria,21
only a few have examined how the performance of one’s racial identity
may affect employment and promotion prospects.22 None have
examined when outside factors such as names are used as proxies for
determining the race of an applicant in order to exclude him or her at a
business’ point of entry. Additionally, none have analyzed how to
address individual proxy discrimination in hiring as it relates to race in
light of theories regarding the social construction of race,23 in particular
F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976), modified en banc on other grounds, 548 F.2d 715 (7th
Cir. 1977) (restating the rule that INS officers may stop suspects only when there is a
“reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts” and declaring that “Spanish
surnames and appearance of Mexican ancestry” are not sufficient justifications).
20. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-81, 390-91 (analyzing discrimination against
black women based on hairstyle); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) (describing how women and people of
color attempt to alter their racial identities in order to prevent discrimination and preempt
stereotyping in the workplace); see also Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination:
The Fair Housing Act’s New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 155-60 (1996)
(arguing that landlords use entitlement to Section 8—a federal subsidized housing
program—as a proxy for “other legally prohibited kinds of discrimination, such as that
based on race, ethnicity, [and] national origin;” and proposing “an amendment to the Fair
Housing Act that would prohibit private landlords from discriminating against
prospective tenants because of their status as rental subsidy holders”); Deborah Hellman,
Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CAL . L. REV. 315, 316
-19 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s theory of wrongful discrimination under the
Equal Protection doctrine is flawed in its failure to recognize the distinction between
proxy discrimination, which involves persons using traits as a tool— a means to an end—
to identify or target a class of persons, and non-proxy discrimination, where the
classification is its own end); Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Discrimination
by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1247-63 (2000) (analyzing discrimination against people of
Mexican descent in California through the use of language in Proposition 227).
21. See Reaves, supra note 18, at 851-52; cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race
as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 2059 (1996) (arguing that if
race can be used as a proxy for a person’s “experiences, outlooks, and ideas” within the
context of measuring diversity for affirmative action purposes, then it might also be
appropriate to use race as such a proxy in other contexts like employment).
22. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20, at 1279-1308; Rich, supra note
9, at 1140.
23. By social construction, we mean that identity categories such as race are not
biologically determined, but instead gain their power and meaning from social relations.
Certainly, sociologist Erving Goffman’s work on social stigma is instructive in this area.
See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2
(1963) (explaining that society places people into categories with attendant ascribed
attributes that effectively constitute a social identity). The ascribed identity provides a
tool to negatively differentiate, so that a person can be “reduced in our minds from a
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.” Id. at 3; see also Ian F. Haney
López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) (asserting that race is a category of
no biological significance, but it “is constructed along cultural, political, and economic
lines” and affects most aspects of our lives).
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what it means to be correctly or incorrectly perceived as belonging to a
certain racial group on the hiring market.24 Here, the real disease of
racial discrimination is the social construct of race as disabling for
certain racial groups, meaning that the pathology of racism results in
presumptions of disability that are viewed as flowing from a certain
racial status, for example, blackness, which is not just about skin color
but the social meaning attached to it.25
Applying theories concerning the social construction of race, this
Article borrows from the definition of disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)26 and the courts’ analyses of
disability discrimination cases under the “regarded as” disabled provision
of the ADA, which allows a plaintiff to bring a claim against an
employer who regards the plaintiff as having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.27 Using the “regarded as”
provision as a model, this Article proposes a new method for recognizing
discrimination claims based on the use of proxies for race—even when
those proxies have been used in a way that mistakenly identifies
someone as belonging to a certain race. In other words, we recognize
that it is not physical race but the presumptions of “disability,” or rather
the constructed social meanings of race, that trigger both conscious and
unconscious forms of discrimination. This Article argues that to redress
discrimination in the workplace, courts must recognize employment
discrimination claims where one is, for example, “regarded as” black,
with all of the socially ascribed negative stereotypes of the group.28
Part I of this Article examines and exposes the ways in which race is
socially constructed and analyzes several studies, including that of
Bertrand and Mullainathan, to demonstrate how the construction of race
by cultural and social factors can have damaging effects on the job
market and in general society for those perceived as belonging to certain
racial groups. Part II analyzes the current framework for evaluating
individual disparate treatment cases based on race, describes how federal
courts have mostly failed to recognize the way in which characteristics
such as race are socially constructed and carry socially significant racial
24. We limit our arguments solely to hiring discrimination cases in which
proxies are used to determine race, but we recognize that our arguments may extend to
other areas, such as gender and other types of discrimination claims.
25. See Michele Goodwin, Race As Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
931, 933 (2004) (“Color is linked with laziness, incompetence, and hostility, as well as
disfavored political viewpoints, such as a lack of patriotism and disloyalty to the United
States.”). We want to make clear that we are not claiming that being black in itself is
disabling, but rather negative stereotypes that are often attached to or imposed upon
Blacks in the employment context have a disabling effect on employment conditions and
opportunities.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000). The ADA defines disability as (1) having
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; (2) having a
record of such a physical or mental impairment; or (3) being “regarded as” having an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) 2000); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1996).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
28. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932.
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meanings, and details such courts’ general treatment of proxy
discrimination claims brought under various antidiscrimination statutes.29
Part III of the Article argues that current case law ignores the fact that
this form of decision-making based on proxies for race is a form of racial
stereotyping and is actually disparate treatment based on race. It then
borrows from a framework used in proving disability discrimination
under the ADA to recommend a novel approach for courts to use in
evaluating cases where a proxy for race was used to discriminate against
a person—that is, where a plaintiff is “regarded as” belonging to a
certain racial group, with all of the attendant socially ascribed negative
stereotypes of the group. Finally, this Article concludes by explaining
the importance of maintaining the effectiveness of Title VII by judicially
interpreting such legislation in a manner that comports with the realities
of racism and race discrimination.
I. NAME THAT RACE: ON BEING “REGARDED AS” BLACK AND THE
SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE
To win a race discrimination in hiring claim under the disparate
treatment theory, an individual plaintiff may either use direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or employ the three-step McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework30 to establish discrimination with indirect
evidence.31 To demonstrate discrimination under this framework, a
29. This Article does not address Title VII claims filed under the disparate
impact theory, which addresses employment practices that are facially neutral but cannot
be justified by business necessity and disproportionately affect one group. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Claims filed under this theory are, in a
sense, claims challenging the use of a “proxy” or factor that is not race but is instead an
indirect way of excluding or discriminating against persons because of race. Although
age, unlike race, had previously not been a legitimate basis for establishing a claim under
the disparate impact theory, the Supreme Court recently held that the ADEA also
authorized recovery for discrimination under the disparate impact theory in Smith v. City
of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005). For an argument that antidiscrimination law should
move away from the dichotomous intent-impact distinction and instead focus on how
courts reason about discrimination claims brought under either doctrinal label, see Sheila
R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 HOUS.
L. REV. 1469, 1470-71 (2005).
30. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of
Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1999). A plaintiff may also prove discrimination under the
mixed motive theory. Under this theory, he or she may use either direct or circumstantial
evidence to prove that his or her protected class was a motivating factor in the
employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90 (2003). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer may not escape liability,
but may limit the remedies available to the plaintiff by proving that it would have made
the same decision even without any discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(2000).
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Dais v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 168 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), will revolutionize disparate
8
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by
proving the following four factors: (1) he or she belongs to a minority
group; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified for the position at
issue; (3) despite his or her qualifications, he or she was not hired; and
(4) after his or her rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from other individuals.32 If the
plaintiff establishes these factors, the court then draws an inference of
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer, who must
articulate a legitimate explanation for rejecting the plaintiff’s
application.33 If the employer does not satisfy this minimal burden, the
plaintiff automatically prevails.34 However, if the employer satisfies this
treatment law in that it will eliminate any distinctions between cases involving proof by
direct evidence and indirect evidence. For example, Professor Michael Zimmer argues:
Desert Palace may go well beyond its immediate predecessors in the
McDonnell Douglas line of cases by creating the basis for a uniform method
of proof for individual discrimination cases that focuses on the evidence and
the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, all without regard to
differentiated rules regarding proof structures.
Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1891, 1922-33 (2004).
32. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If a plaintiff wants to establish his or
her disability discrimination claim with indirect evidence, he or she will follow the same
basic framework that is utilized in race discrimination cases under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis. See Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1996). Only then, the factors of the prima facie case will be
changed to include: proof that (1) “he or she is disabled”; (2) he or she is “otherwise
qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation”; (3) he or she
“suffered an adverse employment decision”; (4) “the employer knew or had reason to
know of the plaintiff’s disability”; and (5) “the position remained open while the
employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.” See id. at
1186. Because in some instances the employer may lawfully rely on a plaintiff’s
disability to reach its adverse employment decision, federal courts analyze these
disability discrimination cases under another standard. Id. In cases where the plaintif f
has direct evidence that the employer relied on his or her disability in making an adverse
employment decision, or if the employer admits reliance on the handicap, the framework
under which the case is analyzed as follows: (1) the plaintiff must first establish that he or
she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the plaintiff must then establish that
he or she is “otherwise qualified” for the position despite his or her disability, either
without accommodation from the employer or with a proposed reasonable
accommodation; and (3) the employer finally must prove that a challenged job criterion is
essential, and therefore, a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will
impose an undue hardship upon the employer. Id.
33. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 254 (noting that the burden on the defendant is only a
burden of production, not a burden of proof).
34. The underlying rationale for this result was most clearly explained by the
Supreme Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), in which
the Court declared:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained,
are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.
And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.
Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely
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burden, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s reason is a pretext
for discrimination to win his or her case.35 The plaintiff may do this
simply by disproving the employer’s asserted reason for its decision.36
For years, scholars have criticized federal courts’ interpretation of
this framework and of antidiscrimination law in general as being
inadequate for addressing and eliminating discrimination in the
workplace.37 For example, Professor Charles Lawrence has detailed the
ways in which antidiscrimination law in employment is essentially ill-
equipped to correct for deeply entrenched notions of white supremacy.38
Additionally, Professor Emily M.S. Houh has utilized contract law, in
particular the doctrine of good faith, to explain the ways in which law
and culture evolve slowly even in the face of progressive beliefs about
race and thus fail to account for the special burdens placed upon
minorities in the workplace.39 Likewise, Professors Devon Carbado and
Mitu Gulati have explored how antidiscrimination law fails to account
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.
Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
35. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256. The Court held that:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion . . . . This burden now merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim
of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation
is unworthy of credence.
Id. (citation omitted).
36. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)
(asserting that the jury may find against the employer but is not required to do so where
the plaintiff has disproved the employer’s asserted justification); see also St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-12 (1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court
explained that even where the plaintiff proves that the employer’s proffered reason is
false, the court is not required to find that discrimination has occurred. Id. at 507-08.
The fact finder may still find for the employer if the fact finder believes that the
employer’s actions were not motivated by race. See id. at 511.
37. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass:
Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS. L. REV.
1517, 1521 (1995) (asserting that Title VII does not facilitate upward mobility for
minorities in internal labor markets).
38. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329-44 (1987) (explaining the nature of
unconscious racism); see also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV . 1923, 2003 (2000) (“[T]his
model of discrimination . . . works to identify intentional wrongdoers and demonstrable
victims, but leaves untouched unconscious racism, everyday cognitive bias, and
institutional structures that faithfully perpetuate patterns of racial subordination.”). But
see Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that Title VII
pertains if the discrimination is “because of” race and that “[t]his is so regardless of
whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did
so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias”).
39. Houh, supra note 14, at 461 (asserting that the “cultural legacies” of what
had been legal forms of white supremacy “are much more difficult to transform because
the myriad apparatuses of their transmission lack the purportedly transparent structure
and process of legal re form”).
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for the manner in which racial and gender stereotyping disadvantage
racial minorities and women in the workplace by forcing them to “work”
their identities such that their actions counter harmful stereotypes in their
occupations.40 In sum, scholars have generally analyzed
antidiscrimination law in employment as disregarding and failing to
account for the social realities of racism. In particular, they have argued
that the law fails to properly incorporate antisubordination principles,
which inquire whether rules or practices work to subordinate one group
over another and examine discrimination as part of a larger societal
structure that reinforces the subordination of oppressed minority
groups.41
The repudiation of antisubordination principles also harms plaintiffs
who file race discrimination claims by failing to acknowledge that race is
not purely a physical concept but also a social construct. Current
interpretations of race-based antidiscrimination law in employment rest
on the notion of physical race—that is, discrimination against a person
with a certain skin color or other physical features that signal
membership in a particular racial group.42 This understanding of race as
a physical concept is most evident in the way courts have treated the last
prong of the prima facie case test under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. Under this prong, an inference of racial
discrimination is created (assuming the other three factors exist) if the
plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly situated individual
outside of his or her racial group, a factor that makes it much more
difficult for a plaintiff to prove discrimination if he or she was replaced
with someone of his or her own race.43 For example, in Jefferies v.
40. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20, at 1260-62 (describing how members of
subordinated groups must do extra identity work on the job to negate the imposition of
harmful stereotypes associated with outsider group members).
41. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS & DEBORAH L. RHODE,
GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 533 (3d ed. 2002).
42. Rich, supra note 9, at 1140 (“Courts have held that an employer only will
be held liable under Title VII when she sanctions an employee because the employee
involuntarily displays a biological, visible or palpable characteristic associated with a
disfavored racial or ethnic group.”); see generally Roy L. Brooks, Race As An Under-
Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 9, 12-27 (1994)
(arguing that the sociological or “civil rights concept of race” has traditionally been
defined by phenotypic differences such as facial features, skin color, and hair, but that
this understanding is too narrow or “underinclusive” because it forces us to separately
look at experiences of subordination across social groups).
43. Two U.S. Supreme court justices have recently reaffirmed this point. See
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Title VII
and other antidiscrimination laws and asserting that “Discrimination, as typically
understood, requires a showing that a claimant received differential treatment vis-à-vis
members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described characteristic.”); and
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 611 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Thomas’ assessment of the showing required to prove discrimination). Courts,
however, have recognized the potential for the occurrence of racial discrimination in
situations where an employer replaced the plaintiff with someone of his or her own race.
See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[C]omparison to a person outside of the [plaintiff’s] protected class . . . is unnecessary
to create an inference of discriminatory discharge.”); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
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Harris County Community Action Association,44 the Fifth Circuit
rejected a black plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination in promotion
because the person who was ultimately granted the promotion for which
the plaintiff had applied was also black.45
This Part of the Article applies racial formation theory within the
context of employment discrimination to show that race is not purely
biological and argues that discrimination based on proxies that highly
correlate with race, such as name and voice, should be covered under
Title VII. Specifically, Part I.A briefly explains theories regarding the
social construction of race, and Part I.B details the results of several
studies on discrimination that effectively demonstrate the role of socially
constructed racial characteristics in perpetuating present-day
discrimination in the workforce.
A. Race as a Social Construct
It is readily accepted among race scholars, including sociologists,
that race, although considered primarily in terms of physical features,
carries different meanings based upon societal understandings of
particular groups. In other words, discrimination against racial
minorities, Blacks in particular, is not merely the result of an aversion to
82 F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (“That one’s replacement is of another race, sex, or
age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition.”); Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir.
1982) (rejecting that an absolute requirement for a prima facie case is a showing that,
after the plaintiff’s discharge, the defendant hired a person who was not in the plaintiff’s
protected class). Courts have also allowed racial and sexual harassment claims to move
forward under Title VII where the employer and the employee were the same race. See,
e.g., Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526 (2003). Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998). (Court finding that for sex-discrimination
premised upon harassment, that a Title VII discrimination claim may arise “because of”
sex in cases where the employer and employee are the same gender).
44. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). For an excellent discussion of the
difficulties of asserting claims at the intersection of race and gender under Title VII, see
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
45. Id. at 1030. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit relied on Adams v. Reed, a sex
discrimination case, in which the court reasoned that “where both the person seeking to
be promoted and the person achieving that promotion were women, ‘because the person
selected was a woman, we cannot accept sex discrimination as a plausible explanation for
[the promotion] decision.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir.
1978) (alteration in original)). The court did, however, recognize that the plaintiff may
have a claim as a black female—a claim based on both race and sex combined—stating:
The essence of Jefferies’ argument is that an employer should not escape
from liability for discrimination against black females by a showing that it
does not discriminate against blacks and that it does not discriminate against
females. We agree that discrimination against black females can exist even
in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.
Id. at 1032.
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dark skin in itself, but to what that dark skin signifies.46 For many
employers, dark skin has signified laziness, unproductivity, and other
stereotypes that have wrongfully been associated with all black
workers.47
To this end, numerous scholars have challenged and criticized the
idea of race as a mere biological fact, demonstrating the ways in which
race is formed and transformed under a constantly shifting society. For
example, Professors Michael Omi and Howard Winant have theorized
about how race is formed in society through a sociohistorical process that
may transform, create, or eliminate racial categories.48 Likewise,
Professor Ian Haney López has explained the ways in which race,
although often signaled by phenotype, is a social construct.49 Indeed, in
addition to physical features, race can and has been defined “by a variety
of identifying factors, such as class, geography, and politics.”50
Because race is not purely physical but also socially constructed,
racial discrimination often takes the form of unfavorable treatment based
upon socially constructed ideas about characteristics that are viewed as
being linked to a particular racial group.51 As Professor Juan Perea once
explained, “Identifying traits need not. . .be physical. In our culture,
foreign-sounding names, like corresponding accents or languages, often
elicit prejudice.”52
Indeed, several recent studies have demonstrated the ways in which
race is socially constructed around characteristics that have come to
signal or gain meaning as a defining feature of a racial group and, as a
result, have created a basis on which employers and others may
discriminate against an individual due to race-based associations or
46. In essence, skin merely acts as a label for the constructed identity. As one
scholar has surmised, “Once labels are applied to people, ideas about people who fit the
label come to have social and psychological effects.” KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE
ETHICS OF IDENTITY 66 (2005). See also Rich, supra note 9, at 1148 (describing how
certain features are used to make “racist or ethnically-biased generalizations about an
individual’s physical or intellectual potential”).
47. See Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25) (asserting that black men “are
often subject to stereotypes that negatively influence [their] attributed identity and
therefore require [them] to do extra identity work in order to achieve hiring and
promotion”); Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932 (“Historians comment that blacks were
perceived as too immature, unsophisticated, and intellectually inferior to properly
exercise the rights granted to citizens.”); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1714-24 (2000) (examining advantages
that may attach to lightness of skin).
48. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 55-61 (2d ed. 1994).
49. See Haney López, supra note 23, at 10-11.
50. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2006) (manuscript at 2-4, on file with authors).
51. See Goodwin, supra note 25, at 932-34; see also Cooper, supra note 10
(manuscript at 9) (stating that “societal discourses about the meaning of different identity
categories interact with one another to differentiate between people who are members of
a certain race and those who are members of that same race”).
52. Perea, supra note 13, at 837.
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prejudices toward such characteristics.53 In the same way that people
“often link color with undesirable personal qualities such as laziness,
incompetence, and hostility,”54 they also often link factors, such as name
or voice, with color and race and any attendant negative stereotypes. In
other words, characteristics such as a person’s name or voice can, in
some instances, “carry enough ethnic meaning to. . .burden [his or her]
daily existence with stereotypes imposed by others.”55
The next section of this Article, Part I.B, will discuss several
features that are often used as proxies for determining an individual’s
race, in particular a person’s name and voice or accent.56 Part I.B.1
focuses on the use of names as proxies for race in social and legal
situations, and Part I.B.2 concentrates on the use of voice, or the sound
of a voice specifically, as a proxy for race, ethnicity, and national origin
under similar circumstances.
53. See Rich, supra note 9, at 1158 (“[People] maintain beliefs about the
dialects, aesthetics, and mannerisms that signal one’s race or ethnic status.”); Perea,
supra note 13, at 835 (asserting that “perceptible differences that mark out-groups
include,” among other things, speech or accent, names, and place of residence).
54. Wang, supra note 10, at 1013-14; cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1724-45 (1993) (asserting that whiteness tends to be
associated with rights and privileges in the context of property); Thomas Ross, The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM . & MARY
L. REV. 1, 34-40 (1990) (discussing how the rhetoric of whiteness often symbolizes
innocence).
55. Perea, supra note 13, at 838 (discussing name changes in particular).
56. These categories are, of course, not exhaustive. For instance, credit-
worthiness can be used as a proxy for race. Even where Blacks and Whites have poor
credit histories, opportunities still appear to be dispersed along racial lines. See David G.
Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small Business Credit Market, 84 REVIEW OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 930 (2003) (asserting that there is qualitative and
quantitative evidence that Blacks are discriminated against in the receipt of small
business loans even where they have similar credit histories to nonblack applicants); see
also Cecil J. Hunt II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted
Predatory Lending Under A New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV.
211, 211 (2003) (claiming that race and not credit risk is the real issue in the lending
market and that, through use of economic profiling, race becomes “a proxy for market
weakness and exploitability, without regard to the income or particular credit worthiness
of the individual”). Credit-worthiness matters within the context of Title VII because of
a recent trend among employers to require credit checks for potential employees. See
Diana Scott, The Unruly Rules on Employee Background Checks, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2004,
at 17. As Blacks are disproportionately represented among the poor, they tend to have
lower credit scores. Employers then that set minimum credit scores as requirements for
employment and promotion would tend to disproportionately eliminate Blacks from the
hiring pool and advancement opportunities. While credit-worthiness can serve as another
type of proxy for race, it is not clear that this and other conditions that correlate along
racial lines carry the saliency of traits like names and voice, which also implicate a
stronger bias—one where actors consciously and unconsciously discriminate without
proof that they are only affecting members of the disfavored group.
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B. The Operation of Proxies for Race
1.NAME
In the post-Civil Rights Era, where employers are readily aware that
outward racial prejudices are not a legally acceptable basis for making
employment decisions, employers can and do use proxies for race, both
consciously and unconsciously, as a means of excluding certain workers
from jobs.57 For example, as stated in the Introduction of this Article,
two scholars, Bertrand and Mullainathan, conducted a study on
employment discrimination in hiring that demonstrated the ways in
which job applicants face discrimination entirely based on social signals
of race due to their names,58 in particular whether their names sounded
like African American or white names.59 In fact, in these experimental
cases, the Boston and Chicago-area employers that were sent the
identical fictitious résumés of applicants with both African American and
white-sounding names never saw faces for the matching fictitious
applicants, nor did they have any means for determining the race of an
applicant other than the applicant’s names themselves.60 Yet, those with
African American-sounding names stood at a significant disadvantage in
the callback process, with applicants with white-sounding names
receiving fifty percent more callbacks.61 In essence, an applicant with a
57. Cf. Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 31) (“The mainstream accepted
the civil rights movement’s basic premise that some blacks warrant inclusion, but
rejected taking that principle to its fullest extent.”).
58. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2, 7-8; see also Bill Maxwell,
Names of Pride or Labels for Stereotypes?, ST . PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 12, 2003,
at 19A, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2003/02/12/news__pf/Columns/
Names_of_pride_or_lab.shtml (describing an incident in which he spoke to a classroom,
turned his back to the students, and correctly guessed whether each student was white or
African American based on first name alone).
59. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2 (“We experimentally
manipulate[d] perception of race via the name on the résumé.”). In selecting names that
were either white-sounding or African American-sounding, Bertrand and Mullainathan
“use[d] name frequency data calculated from birth certificates of all babies born in
Massachusetts between 1974 and 1979” and “tabulate[d] these data by race to determine
which names [were] distinctively White and which [were] distinctively African
American.” Id. at 7; see also Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and
Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 767, 769-70 (2004). The
authors found that:
Even among popular names, racial patterns are pronounced. Names such as
DeShawn, Tyrone, Reginald, Shanice, Precious, Kiara, and Deja are quite
popular among Blacks, but virtually unheard of for Whites. The opposite is
true for names like Connor, Cody, Jake, Molly, Emily, Abigail, and Caitlin.
Each of those names appears in at least 2,000 cases (between 1989-2000),
with less than 2 percent of the recipients Black.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 2, 6-9 (noting that they
restricted themselves to “resumes posted more than six months prior to the start of the
experiment”).
61. Id. at 2-3, 10 & tbl.1.
15
white-sounding name and no markers that identified him or her as
black could expect one callback for every ten job advertisements while
an African American “would need to apply to 15 different ads to achieve
the same result.”62 As Bertrand and Mullainathan asserted, “a white
name yield[ed] as many more callbacks as an additional eight years of
experience” would have yielded for an African American. 63
Additionally, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that the gap between
black and white job applicants widened with résumé quality.64 Although
higher quality résumés65 generally resulted in higher callback rates, the
benefit of having a higher quality résumé for a perceived African
American applicant was statistically insignificant but was statistically
significant for those perceived to be white applicants.66 The callback rate
for white applicants with a higher quality résumé was eleven percent
compared to 8.8 percent for those with lower quality résumés, with a
statistically significant difference of 2.51 percentage points or thirty
percent.67 However, black applicants with higher quality résumés
received callbacks 6.99 percent of the time, compared to 6.41 percent of
the time for those with lower quality résumés, resulting in just a .58
percent difference in percentage points, or nine percent.68
After the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s study were
revealed, numerous reporters interviewed human resources employees to
verify the results, finding that in many instances such employees were
encouraged, if not ordered, to eliminate applications or résumés with
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 3, 10 & tbl.5.
64. Id. at 3, 12 (“Discrimination therefore appears to bite twice [for African
Americans], making it harder not only for African Americans to find a job but also to
improve their employability.”).
65. See supra note 6 (defining higher quality résumés as those that had more
labor market experience, fewer holes in the employment history, an e-mail address, some
certification degree, foreign language skills, and some honors).
66. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 12 & tbl.4.
67. Id.
68. Id. As part of a story on 20/20 in 2004, ABC News conducted its own
study by posting on popular job websites twenty-two pairs of names with identical
resumes. The only difference, again, was the name on each pair of documents. They
found that “the white resumes were actually downloaded 17 percent more often by job
recruiters looking for candidates.” 20/20: Can a Name Hold You Back in Job Search?
(ABC television broadcast Sept. 20, 2004) (transcript on file with authors). Black
participants in the study responded as follows:
CARITA (PARTICIPANT): I was just blown away. Kathleen got
phone calls for three of the four weeks of the study and I didn’t get any. And
Kathleen—does not exist. There is no Kathleen.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): Arsenetta was envious of her made-up
white counterpart Kimberly.
ARSENETTA (PARTICIPANT): They were calling her morning
noon and night. I was sitting there looking at my phone going, I wanted to
answer that phone call and tell the man I’m interested in the job.
Id.
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African American-sounding names.69 Indeed, some job applicants,
who are readily aware of hiring biases based on ethnic-sounding names,
have purposefully used names other than their own on their résumés to
apply for jobs.70 These job applicants might include a Latino Guillermo
who becomes William or a black Tyree who simply becomes Ty. In fact,
numerous actors and actresses of color have changed their names to
white-sounding names in order to avoid prejudices in the film and
television industries. For example, Martin Sheen, star of the hit
television series The West Wing, changed his name from Ramon Estevez,
later explaining his decision by proclaiming “I know what it means to
have an [sic] Hispanic name.”71
Moreover, discrimination based on the perceived ethnicity or race of
an applicant due to name is not limited to people of color. Just as a black
Nyasha may be excluded on the basis of discrimination caused by racial
stereotyping due to her ethnic-sounding name, a white applicant named
Nyasha, who did not in some way identify herself as white on her
résumé, could suffer similar discrimination simply because of her name,
which may have incorrectly signaled to hiring decision-makers that she
was black or even the “wrong kind” of White.72
69. The popular aforementioned 20/20 news program explored issues of proxy
discrimination based on name in a show that aired on September 20, 2004. The
following colloquy took place between Jami Floyd of ABC News and a job recruiter for
Fortune 500 companies in northern California:
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): If you’re looking at two résumés, all
else being equal, one says Shaniqua, one says Jennifer, you’re going to call
who first?
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE): I would call Jennifer first.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): It’s a choice, she said, she was trained
to make. When representing certain companies, [I learned] don’t send black
candidates. And on a résumé, a name may be the only cue of an applicant’s
race.
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE): I think the way that I had been taught
and what has helped me to succeed in the industry is unfair.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS):And racist.
JOB RECRUITER (FEMALE):Absolutely, yes.
Id.
70. Cf. Maxwell, supra note 58, at 19A (arguing that black parents unfairly
burden their children with made-up Afrocentric names).
71. Perea, supra note 13, at 837. Not every name change involves a move
away from racial or ethnic identification. For example, singer-actress Dana Owens has
enjoyed substantial success under her assumed name, Queen Latifah. Based on Bertrand
and Mullainathan’s work, one wonders how Queen Latifah’s name choice would have
affected her employment possibilities outside of the entertainment world, and whether
even in the entertainment world she would have experienced more difficulties had she
selected an African American-sounding name rather than an African name. See infra
notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
72. One of the author’s friends, a white woman named Nyasha, has often
commented on surprised reactions from people when they meet her in person after first
knowing her name.
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One could argue, however, that employers who make decisions
based upon the sound of a name alone are not acting solely on the basis
of race, but instead may also be drawing inferences about a number of
the applicant’s traits. For instance, employers who make a decision
based on an applicant’s name could be making a decision based upon
social class. This would certainly seem plausible given the results of
another recent study that claims to measure the effect of having black
racially-identifiable names on teacher expectations and test performance
within elementary education.73 In this study, Professor David Figlio
asserts that teachers and school administrators expect less from children
with “names that are associated more with low socio-economic status,
names that are disproportionately given to black children.”74 He then
theorizes that this disparate treatment may partially explain the testing
gap between Blacks and Whites because “names concentrated in the
black community are related to diminished student test performance in
mathematics and reading.”75 He further claimed that, even among names
with a high blackness index, the names with the greatest correlation to
lower socioeconomic status experienced the largest test gap, even among
children who came from the same family.76
While the importance of class as a discriminatory tool should not be
minimized, substituting class analysis for discussions of race is
dangerous, especially where poor white workers are not generally subject
to the assumptions related to racial stereotypes that affect poor Blacks.77
An argument that decision-makers within labor markets can decouple
race and class status also neglects socially constructed meanings of race
and how that construction can employ class as a tool to infer which
“kinds” of Blacks are acceptable in the workplace. More importantly, as
Bertrand and Mullainathan demonstrated in their study, within the labor
market context, it was race (even in its strictly physical sense), and not
class, that was predominantly at work in the decision of the employers in
73. David N. Figlio, Names, Expectations and the Black-White Test Score Gap
3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11195, 2005), available at
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/figlio/blacknames1.pdf. Figlio does not, however, believe that
only Blacks bear the costs of having uncommon names. See Noah Bierman, Students’
Names May Play A Role in Classroom, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 2005, at 1B (describing
another Figlio study which analyzed mostly white subjects and found that persons with
the most uncommon spellings of the name “Caitlin” were likely to experience “trouble
reading when [they] reache[d] third or fourth grade”).
74. Figlio, supra note 73, at 3; see also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 58, at 769-71
(arguing that distinctively black names are associated with lower parental education and
lower per capita income).
75. Figlio, supra note 73, at 14.
76. Id. at 15 (noting that even within the same family, the brother named
Dwayne would be expected to test better than his brother DeMarcus, who would test
better than his brother Da’Quan); see also Christopher Goffard, Ethnic-Sounding Names
May Hurt Kids: UF Professor Finds Some Cause Subtle Bias, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), June 15, 2005, at 1E (describing the Figlio study).
77. See, e.g ., Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race,
Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV . 799, 829-32 (2003)
(discussing the manner in which class consciousness is “raced”).
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the study.78 Even when Bertrand and Mullainathan signaled factors
such as class to employers with addresses in predominantly white and
more educated neighborhoods, applicants with African American-
sounding names yielded no greater returns.79 Although applicants who
lived in more educated and higher income neighborhoods had a higher
probability of receiving a callback, there was no evidence that African
Americans benefited any more than Whites from living in such
neighborhoods.80 Indeed, as Bertrand and Mullainathan indicated, “if
ghettos and bad neighborhoods are particularly stigmatizing for African
Americans, one might have expected African Americans to be helped
more by having a ‘good’ address.”81 In sum, it was the names of the
perceived African American applicants and the ways in which such
names signaled negative social background and characteristics, such as
laziness and incompetence, that resulted in the racial discrimination, and
not any other external factors.82
78. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 20-21; see also Camille A.
Nelson, Breaking the Camel’s Back: A Consideration of Mitigatory Criminal Defenses
and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 77, 84 (2003)
(“[D]iscrimination is not limited to low-income or uneducated Blacks, but is also
reported by Black middle-class professionals.”).
79. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 2, at 13-14.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 13-14; see also Discrimination Research Ctr., Names Make a
Difference: The Screening of Resumes by Temporary Employment Agencies in
California 3, 14 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished report), http://drcenter.org/staticdata/pdfs/
name_resume_study.pdf (describing in a study of the effect of names on hiring through
temporary employment agencies in California that, after September 11, Arab Americans
and South Asians received the lowest response rate from temporary agencies) [hereinafter
Names Make a Difference]. Researchers have found that these racial prejudices based on
name, or rather whether a name sounds African American, begins at an early age. Jack
Daniel of the University of Pittsburgh found this in his study of elementary school
students:
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who is
smartest, Sarah or Shaniqua?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Sarah.
JAMI FLOYD (ABC NEWS): But how far are we from that kind of
change [away from racism in society]? Jack Daniel, vice provost of the
University of Pittsburgh studied four and five-year-old children to find out.
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who would
you like to play with, Tanisha or Megan?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Megan.
. . . .
JACK DANIEL (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH): Who took the
bite out of your sandwich? Do you think it was Adam or Jamal?
GRADE SCHOOL STUDENT (MALE): Jamal.
20/20: Can a Name Hold You Back in Job Search?, supra note 68. The answers of black
children were neutral to these questions, but white children “were disturbingly more
likely to associate negative traits with black names.” Id. (quoting Jami Floyd of ABC
News).
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For courts to allow discrimination that is based on names that
correlate with blackness, but which does not directly involve an explicit
race-based decision, misses the reality of living as a “raced” person in
the United States.83 It also treats the use of proxies, more generally, as
typically not cognizable within antidiscrimination law. This seems
bizarre given that courts routinely traffic in the most prevalent proxy for
race: color.84 At bottom, studies, such as the one conducted by Bertrand
and Mullainathan, remind us that not all disfavored citizens and workers
are created (un)equal. Society operates on the understanding that there
are bad and good (or not quite as bad) Blacks85 or rather that there are
bad Blacks and Blacks who have achieved the status of “honorary
Whites.”86
Names then become difference-markers or tools to distinguish
between the acceptable and unacceptable Blacks. The tool could be a
proxy for race and socioeconomic status, social compatibility, or political
agenda. Race, however, is always present in the consideration. What
one’s name tells the world about how one performs his or her race
controls the ultimate decision.87 That decision has implications for both
83. This use of race as an adjective is meant to signal that courts have failed to
acknowledge that assigning individuals to a specific race, along with its attendant
meanings, is a process. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling
and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV . 1689, 1694 (2000) (“The term
racialization embodies the idea of race as a process. [There are] two aspects of
racialization that are part of racial profiling—the racial category and differences in the
cultural means of subordination.”); John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing
the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1415 (2002)
(“Historically, those with power have raced society to stratify people based on color,
nationality, and ethnicity.”); and Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (1993) (“I have
suggested in some of my work in critical race theory that ‘race’ is a verb, that we are
‘raced’ through a constellation of practices that construct and control racial
subjectivities.”).
84. See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color , 49 DUKE L.J.
1487, 1551-55 (2000).
85. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 23) (“The way for a Good
Black Man to ‘play by the rules’ is to ‘downplay his racial identity.’”); Carbado & Gulati,
supra note 9, at 721 (discussing the hiring of “black people of a certain kind”); see also
David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1924, 1927
(1999) (book review) (analyzing the way in which a black Harvard Law School graduate,
who chose to downplay his racial identity, “worked” his racial identity at his law firm).
86. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate
Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1658
(2004) (“A person is racially palatable if she is perceived to be peripherally or
unstereotypically nonwhite; she is racially salient if she is perceived to be centrally or
stereotypically nonwhite.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of
O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith—Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 236
(1996) (discussing how African Americans who are accorded the status of honorary
Whites have a type of racial invisibility).
87. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 86, at 1676-77 (asserting that “firms will
screen for racial palatability and against performative racial difference,” and that “firms
will hire people who are phenotypically but unconventionally black—that is to say,
people who ‘look’ but do not ‘act’ black”). Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written
about the work people of color do to counter harmful stereotypes of minority identities
operating in employment environments, see supra note 40, and have also more generally
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the culture of the work environment and the behavior of minority
workers.
By distinguishing between name-based discrimination and race
discrimination, courts send a signal to employers as to what values and
forms of regulation are acceptable within the workplace. At some point,
we must ask how the use of proxies as a basis for discrimination harms
the workplace. In the résumé context, giving import to names as a proxy
for identity invites dubious racial consideration into the work
environment by remapping racial constructions onto items that might
otherwise be substantially race-neutral.88 Additionally, Professor Tristin
Green has recently surmised that business practices, such as appearance
codes, result in a discriminatory work environment where minorities are
punished for failing to “fit in.”89 She further theorizes that courts avoid
recognizing the discrimination aspects of the cases by seeing them
through the prism of “business prerogative” rather than
antidiscrimination.90 Strangely, similar to the justification for
appearance codes, businesses could claim that they avoid ethnic names
for business reasons, regardless of an individual’s race, because, for
example, their customers or partners do not relate to Lakishas or
Jamals.91 Our question then is: should employers be permitted to use this
type of justification when such policies endorse the rejection of persons
who are presumed tainted by stereotypical notions of what race means?
We believe Title VII requires the answer to be no. Even where there are
legitimate business reasons, using race in this way results in at least a
mixed-motive discrimination claim.92 Until some proper business
addressed the notion of race as a “performative identity.” Their claim is that “the social
meaning of, for example, a black person’s racial identity is a function of the way in which
that person performs (presents) her blackness” such that Blacks can choose to accept or
reject societal expectations of behaving “conventionally” (that is, in accordance with
predominant stereotypes). Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of
Critical Race Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112
YALE L.J. 1757, 1771-72 (2003) (book review).
88. This statement is premised upon the notion that with the exception of
information like names or group memberships in affinity organizations, one can choose
to be race-neutral on a résumé. See Thomas supra note 83, and Gotanda, supra note 83
(discussing race-ing or racialiazation as processes).
89. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 625,
655-56 (2005).
90. Id. at 658-59.
91. This was the nature of the claim of an employer with regard to his Arab
employee in El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005). See also
discussion infra notes 186 & 233. As at least one scholar has surmise that even where
these types of business concerns are legitimate, they can serve to reinforce harmful
social norms. ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 23-27 (2001). Using a sex discrimination example where an
employer claimed that hiring women would reduce their profits, Professor Post asserts
that we should not imagine Title VII as requiring the destruction of gender norms, but
instead we should “challenge [ourselves] to explore the precise ways in which Title VII
should alter the norms by which sex is given social meaning.” Id. at 26.
92. In other words, while we think name avoidance is a type of discrimination
“because of” race, it could also represent mixed-motive discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(m) (2000) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
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purpose is advanced, however, such discrimination violates Title VII
because it effects disparate treatment of those perceived as racial
minorities.93
Beyond the work environment, there are also consequences to
individual personal choices and behaviors stemming from such practices.
The concept that there are preferred behaviors and statuses even among
generally disfavored groups reinforces the notion of race as a social
construction. It also results in a group of individuals who cover by
intentionally acting in a way that avoids identifiers of the unacceptable
performance of blackness.94 According to some scholars, this type of
behavior should be expected.
Clark Freshman, for example, theorizes that “outgroup” members
do not exist within a uniform coalition.95 Those who are the most
advantaged members of outgroups, like Larry Mungin, a black Harvard
Law School graduate who admitted to playing the role of the good Black
as a survival strategy,96 seek to curry favor with the “ingroup” by proving
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing alleged Title
VII mixed-motive discrimination a in a case brought by a female warehouse worker).
93. While not advocating proxy discrimination claims explicitly, Green appears
to agree with this analysis in such cases: “Using disparate treatment theory, for example
we might provide individuals with a legal right to be free from adverse employment
actions taken for a lack of fit with a discriminatory work culture.” Green supra note 89,
at 665-66. Earlier within her article, Green introduced the story of Keisha Akbar, a black
female scientist who wore her hair in braids or natural; wore clothing featuring African
styles; and spoke Black English Vernacular to fellow black employees, and who was not
promoted at the small research firm where she worked. Id. at 646 (discussing Keisha’s
story, and citing to its earlier appearance in the work of another scholar, see Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2010-13 (1995)) . Under Professor Green’s
approach, Keisha would be permitted to sue for discriminatory denial of a promotion
based on failure to comply with a discriminatory work culture.
94. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 714-19; see also Jean Shin, The
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1-2 (2004) (exploring covering behavior by
using the metaphor of “the closet” to describe the ways Asian Americans may downplay
ethnic behavior either to appear less “visible” as a move toward whiteness or merely to
hide their foreignness, as they project identities as “model minorities”). Ultimately, this
type of “covering” behavior works to the disadvantage of Blacks and other racial
minorities. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE
IN AMERICA (1999) (describing the story of a black Harvard Law School graduate who
worked hard in his career and personal life to be the “good Black”—to avoid views,
objects, and behaviors that could be identified as black). For example, the irony of the
story in The Good Black was that the attorney ultimately filed a racial discrimination suit
against his law firm, alleging that he was denied consideration for partnership and
mistreated in terms of pay and assignments because of his race. See generally Mungin v.
Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concerning the race
discrimination cause of action brought by Mungin). In other words, even though he
aggressively “worked” his identity to avoid being grouped as just another Black, he was
unable to escape racial discrimination.
95. Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social
Science Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “Different”
Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 329, 427 (2000).
96. See supra note 94.
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they are more similar to the ingroup than they are to less advantaged
outgroup members.97 This behavior is detrimental on a number of levels.
First, because it is a move to prove how much one is like the dominant
group, it becomes a new form of “passing,”98 where one is attempting to
mitigate or erase differences through racial identity performance.99 This
behavior, which can be understood as an expression of internalized
oppression, can be harmful to the individual engaging in the conduct.100
Worse still, it results in even minority persons supporting the ends of
97. Cooper, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25-38) (describing how middle class
heterosexual black men are incentivized by the “Good Black Man” image to assimilate in
the form of emulating white men); Freshman, supra note 95, at 435-38; see also Carbado
& Gulati, supra note 86, at 1676 (explaining how the minorities who are most likely to
succeed in corporate environments are the ones “who exhibit the greatest insider-group
affinity”); Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need for, and
Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV.
759, 779-83 (2003) (discussing intra-group conflicts and differences within minority
identity communities that require coalition building to overcome). This attempt by
outsiders to hide disfavored identities or identity traits has also been noted outside of the
context of racial identities. See Marc A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: “Jews,”
“Homosexuals,” and the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation as a Forbidden Characteristic
in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 45-47 (2001) (arguing that
Jewish people and gays and lesbians engage in identity “self-censorship” with regard to
those traits most commonly associated with their identities or engage in “politics of
safety” to minimize the appearance of those traits that might emphasize their identities).
98. “Passing refers to an individual’s ‘decision’ to rely upon his or her light
skin and European features in order to assume the life and privilege of a White person
secretly.” Tanya Katerí Hernandez, “MultiRacial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in
an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV . 97, 123 (1998).
Passing is a deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or identities
from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards in the absence
of his misleading conduct. The classic racial passer in the United States has
been the “white Negro”: the individual whose physical appearance allows
him to present himself as “white” but whose “black” lineage (typically only a
very partial black lineage) makes him a Negro according to dominant racial
rules.
Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001). For examples
and analyses of the behavior within legal academe, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 223 (1991) (discussing her godmother who was
abandoned by her mother so the mother could pass as a white woman); Harris, supra note
54, at 1710-14 (discussing her grandmother’s passing and the significance of race as a
factor in property rights).
99. Professor Kenji Yoshino defines a similar type of behavior—downplaying
racial identity—as “covering.” Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002).
100. See Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1161-66 (presenting the real and fictional
stories of Blacks who passed for Whites and discussing the psychic and emotional toll of
the behavior); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 50 (manuscript at 19-23) (detailing the harms
of “passing” for those involved in interracial relationships and gay and lesbian
relationships); see also Fajer, supra note 97, at 45-47 (discussing the psychological harm
that befalls gays, lesbians, and Jews who hide or “closet” their identities); Jennifer Swize,
Note, Transracial Adoption and the Unblinkable Difference: Racial Dissimilarity Serving
the Interests of Adopted Children, 88 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1115-16 (2002) (discussing the
emotional toll of “passing” as biological children, and how it is less of an issue within the
context of transracial adoptions).
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tokenism.101 The names studies prove at once the complexity of how
race is constructed by those in power and performed by those who lack
it.
2.VOICE
Much like with names, studies have also revealed a direct link
between discrimination on the basis of race and voice, in particular
between disparate treatment and sounding black or Latino.102 In the
same way that having an African American-sounding name has been
proven to be a disadvantage to job applicants on the market, having what
is deemed to be a black or a Latino voice has also been proven to be
equally harmful under various circumstances.
In fact, as studies and cases reveal, not only do people believe that
they can correctly identify the race of a person simply by listening to the
individual,103 but they also do correctly identify people by race on the
basis of voice alone.104 For example, a study conducted by Professors
John Baugh, William Idsardi, and Thomas Purnell indicated that the
average lay person can accurately identify the race of a person based on
voice more than seventy percent of the time.105 Moreover, as the three
101. Since Bertrand and Mullainathan did not report finding differences between
black and white decision-makers, we must conclude that Blacks harbor the same bias
against African American-sounding names. This bias could operate in the same manner
that it works for Whites, where it is the social construction of blackness that leads to the
behavior. The choice that some Blacks make in identity performance or relying upon
“passing” behaviors might, however, provide a different explanation for the conduct of
black employers. Passing carries with it the need to both limit being discovered and to
distance one’s self from persons who can challenge one’s identity performance.
Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1167-68. Moreover, those who are attempting to pass may
have an interest in “community censoring” or of only letting in other minorities who
behave appropriately. Fajer, supra note 97, at 46-47. Behaviors such as these lead to the
conclusion that some black decision-makers may be acting with a greater understanding
or consciousness about the choice to exclude than white employers.
102. See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
103. See Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 373-76 (Ky. 1999) (allowing
a police officer to testify to the race of the person he heard talking in a room, but did not
see, merely because the voice the police officer heard “sounded as if it was of a male
black”); see also Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 471 (11th Cir. 1999)
(involving a black plaintiff who sued her employer after she was terminated from a
telemarketing firm that conducted “get-out-the-vote” calls, where the firm used “race-
matching”—black employees being directed to speak from a “Black” script for their
calls); Lis Wiehl, “Sounding Black” in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial
Stereotyping, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 185, 201-10 (2002) (arguing that racial
identification on the basis of voice alone is dangerous because it gives legitimacy to the
admission of evidence based on racial prejudice and stereotyping); Jill Gaulding, Against
Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 637, 637 (1998) (arguing that black English is such a close proxy for race
that it should be protected under Title VII).
104. See Wiehl, supra note 103, at 193.
105. Thomas Purnell et al., Perpetual and Phonetic Experiments on American
English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 22 (1999)
(describing a study generally measuring the impact of Chicano English, African
American Vernacular English, and Standard American English dialects on access to
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scholars noted, the average lay person can correctly identify the race of
a speaker simply by hearing him or her say one word.106 In fact, studies
have shown that, “[n]ot only are [lay persons] quick to identify, the race
of someone speaking Black English Vernacular, but they are also able to
identify the race of code-switching Blacks—those speaking Standard
English but with a ‘black’ pronunciation of certain words.”107
More importantly, studies have also shown how negative
attachments are made by listeners when the voice and the race of the
speaker are believed to be or known to be black or Latino.108 In one
study, separate video footage was made of a white child, an African
American child, and a Latino child, with each child filmed speaking
alone and the same standard English voice dubbed on to all three
videotapes.109 The subjects of the study were then shown the separate
films and told to score the speech they heard on each film for
standardness and fluency.110 When the results of the study were
tabulated, it was revealed that the white child was judged the most
standard and fluent; the African American child was judged fluent, but
not standard; and the Latino child was judged the least fluent.111 As one
scholar explained about the effects of stereotyping when one is believed
to be or regarded as black or Latino, “The assessors thought they were
reacting to the speech they heard, but in fact they were reacting to racial
stereotypes based on what they had seen.”112
Additionally, Professors Baugh, Idsardi, and Purnell found in four
different experiments that examined the treatment of different fictitious
renters based upon the three dialects—African American Vernacular
English, Chicano English, and Standard American English—and found
that even qualified black and Chicano renters were unlikely to get an
appointment to view an apartment in certain white residential areas.113 In
other words, they found that “auditory discrimination arises without
visual contact.”114
rental housing in four San Francisco and Bay Area communities); see also Massey &
Lundy, supra note 13, at 454.
106. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 28; see also Wiehl, supra note 103, at 194
(“[S]tudies show that a person can identify an African American caller within the first 5-7
seconds of a phone call.”).
107. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 454 (providing one example of lay
persons’ ability to identify race based on voice).
108. See Wiehl, supra note 103, at 194 (citing FREDERICK WILLIAMS, SOME
RESEARCH NOTES ON DIALECT ATTITUDES AND STEREOTYPES, IN LANGUAGE ATTITUDES:
CURRENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 113-28 (Roger Shuy & Ralph W. Fasold eds., 1973)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 12.
114. Id. While this article limits itself to redressing the use of proxies in the
context of discrimination in access to employment, studies such as this suggest that the
use of proxies should also be further analyzed within the context of housing
discrimination. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 20, at 170 (proposing that Congress amend
the Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination based on requirements that are proxies for
25
Finally, Professors Douglas Massey and Garvey Lundy
demonstrated through their study “that landlords do, in fact, discriminate
against prospective tenants on the basis of the sound of their voice during
telephone conversations.”115 To conduct their study, the professors used
a multiracial group of men and women116 that included native speakers of
Black English Vernacular (“BEV”), Black Accented English (“BAE”),
and White Middle Class English (“WME”), who basically spoke from a
standard script in their calls to landlords.117 During this study, the two
scholars discovered that people experienced discrimination based on the
intersection of race, sex, and class with regard to access to a landlord,
access to a rental unit, and requests about their credit histories.118 For
example, Professors Massey and Lundy determined that the likelihood of
even reaching an agent by having the agent return a call was significantly
affected by race, gender, and class (as determined by speech).119 In
particular, female speakers of BEV, otherwise identified as lower-class
black women, consistently fared the worst.120 The professors found that
eighty-seven percent of the white male subjects were able to speak with a
rental agent while black-accented males got through only eighty percent
of the time, white middle-class females got through only seventy-five
percent of the time, black-accented females got through only seventy-one
percent of the time, and black vernacular females got through only sixty-
three percent of the time.121 In addition, they found that:
[w]hereas more than three-quarters of white middle-class males
gained access to a potential rental unit (76%), the figure
dropped to 63% for middle-class black men (those speaking
BAE), 60% for white middle-class females (those speaking
WME), 57% for black middle-class females (those speaking
BAE), 44% for lower-class black men (those speaking BEV),
protected classes and noting that, although one court had analyzed Section 8
discrimination under a Title VII disparate impact theory, a federal circuit court had
rejected this type of analysis).
115. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 455.
116. The projected image of the renters was of a recent college graduate in his or
her early to midtwenties with an annual income of $25,000-$30,000 and a rent ceiling of
$800 dollars. Id. at 458.
117. Id. at 460-61.
118. Id. at 461-62. “Not only does considerable discrimination occur over the
phone, based purely on a verbal interaction between renters and agents, but considerable
discrimination also occurs with no contact whatsoever, largely through the use of voice
mail and answering machines as racial screening devices.” Id. at 467. BAE is presumed
to be spoken by middle-class Blacks. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 461-62.
120. Id. at 467.
121. Id. at 460-61, 465 (“At a minimum, therefore, black females can expect to
put in 40% more effort than white males just to reach a rental agent.”).
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and just 38% for lower-class black women (those speaking
BEV).122
Finally, they found that whereas credit history was raised and
discussed as an issue with only three percent of white middle-class
males, it was raised with five percent of white middle-class females, ten
percent of black males regardless of class, twenty-one percent of middle-
class black females, and twenty-three percent of lower-class black
females.123 In sum, much like with name, speech can work to identify
individuals as members of a particular race and thus leave them
vulnerable to discrimination based upon negative stereotypes that are
associated with that racial group.
In some ways, this brand of proxy discrimination is different from
name discrimination. With names, there is an understanding that
employers who reject Blacks with ethnic-sounding names may still be
fine with offering interviews to Blacks with nonblack-sounding names.124
It would seem odd to surmise, although not entirely inconceivable, that
those who are practicing voice discrimination are merely searching for
white-sounding Blacks or Latinos. These property owners or managers
seem to be using their proxy as a method to eliminate all Blacks and
Latinos from the tenant pool, meaning there are no “good Blacks or
Latinos” where these individuals are concerned.125 Voice discrimination,
however, is similar to name discrimination in what it tells us about the
complexities of racial formation and the performativity of identity.126 In
fact, in the same way that many people of color have changed their
names to avoid discrimination, both conscious and unconscious, on the
basis of their ethnic-sounding names,127 many people of color have
intentionally used a “‘white-sounding’ voice, either one’s own or a
friend’s, [as] one painful strategy. . .to get around some
discrimination.”128
122. Id. at 461 (“In other words, for every call a white male makes to find out
about a rental unit in the Philadelphia housing market, a poor black female must make
two calls to achieve the same level of access, roughly doubling her time and effort
compared with his.”).
123. Id.
124. In many ways, this is an optimistic assumption, supported mainly by the
fact that a substantial number of African Americans are gainfully employed. If, however,
one were committed to a more skeptical position, it could be argued that there may be
very little difference in the receptiveness toward minorities by those who discriminate on
voice versus those who use name, since Blacks who are not eliminated from
consideration based on their names can still be effectively eliminated once their race is
confirmed at an interview.
125. This claim is proven where Blacks and Latinos who sound white and are
invited to view rental units are still denied the ability to rent once their races are
discovered. Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 12-22.
126. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20; Rich, supra note 9.
127. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
128. Massey & Lundy, supra note 13, at 455 (quoting JOE R. FEAGAN & MELVIN
P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 229 (1994)); see
also RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
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II.EXPOSING THE FAILURE OF COURTS TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE: THE NEED FOR THE “RIGHT KIND” OF
ANALYSIS
While society has shifted since the passage of Title VII and the
acceptability of openly equating race and color with negative group
characteristics and then applying them to individuals has nearly
dissipated, context-specific judicial analyses of raced-based employment
discrimination claims has deteriorated. While some federal courts once
recognized race as a socially constructed and fluid construct, most now
treat race as a purely physical concept.129
This understanding of race and racial discrimination is problematic.
First, in a world where multiculturalism and claims to biracial or
multiracial identities are increasing, such a rule gives employers greater
power to hide discriminatory treatment in the workplace.130 Second, this
conception hardly leaves any room for analyzing discrimination based
upon socially constructed definitions of race, including distinctions that
are made between jobs that an employer deems appropriate for certain
racial groups and distinctions that are made between members of the
same racial group,131 for example, concepts of good versus bad African
ADOPTION 290 (2003) (describing how his mother would “pass” over the phone because
listeners imagined she was white).
129. See Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992) (“Discrimination stems from a reliance on immaterial
outward appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined, usually undesirable,
characteristics thought to be common to members of the group that shares these
superficial traits. It results in a stubborn refusal to judge a person on his merits as a
human being.”); see also Rich, supra note 9, at 1141-42 (describing how discrimination
against race-ethnicity performance should also constitute race-based discrimination
because, in such cases, “the employer sanctions the employee because of a fear of racial
or ethnic presence: The employee’s appearance reminds the employer of the employee’s
minority status and her potential to disrupt the current cultural hegemony of the
workplace.”). Of course, in 1964 when Title VII was enacted, it was not necessary to
explicitly discuss the ways in which race was socially constructed because it was clear at
the time that, in the eyes of much of white society, no black people were acceptable.
130. As Professor Trina Jones argues, where employees inhabit multiracial
identities, it gives employers an opportunity to choose which “race” they used to classify
a plaintiff in a discrimination suit. Jones, supra note 84, at 1552. For example, if a black
person is hired or promoted over a person of black and white heritage, the employer
could claim they regarded the plaintiff as black. See id. If a white or multiracial person
were hired or promoted, the employer could similarly claim in each case that he believed
the disfavored employee belonged to the racial group of the selected or preferred
employee. See id. at 1551-53.
131. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, U.S.
v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1182 (1995). The court
observed:
As more well-educated blacks flowed into America’s mainstream,
whites even began to differentiate between the kind of blacks who reflected
white values and who were not like “those other” blacks akin to the inner city
stereotype.
A benign neglect for the harmful impact or fallout upon the black
community that might ensue from decisions made by the white community
for the “greater good” of society has replaced intentional discrimination.
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Americans.132 For instance, federal courts’ application of the “same
actor inference,” which contends that a decision-maker who fired or did
not promote the plaintiff is presumed not to have acted on racial
prejudice because of the earlier decision to hire the plaintiff in the first
place,133 neglects the fact that a decision-maker may view some members
of a racial group as more preferable than others,134 or a particular entry
level job as appropriate for members of a certain racial group but
consider a higher level position in the company as being too good for
members of that racial group.135
Likewise, cases in which the courts have determined that the hiring
or promotion of a person in the plaintiff’s same racial group precludes a
finding of discrimination disregard the fact that the decision not to hire or
promote the plaintiff may have been based on stereotypical conceptions
of blackness—of views that the plaintiff was not the “right kind” of
Black.136 The negative power of such stereotypes is evident even where
[W]hites have become indignant at the suggestion that they harbor any ill-
will towards blacks or retain any vestiges of racism. After all, they have
black friends. They work with black people every day. They enjoy black
entertainers on their favorite television programs every night.
Id. at 779 (emphasis added); see also Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928,
931 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1071 (1994) (explaining that under Title VII, a
fired black employee had to show that, despite his own lacking performance, the
employer demonstrated more favorable treatment to nonblack employees with similarly
lacking performance).
132. See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 94 (describing the story of a black Harvard
Law School graduate who “covered” in certain ways, including his dress, to distinguish
himself from other African Americans as a “good Black”); Yoshino, supra note 99, at
879-87 (discussing the ways in which Larry Mungin “covered” or downplayed his race to
put Whites at ease).
133. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995);
Choate v. Transp. Logistics Corp., 234 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D. Conn. 2002).
134. See Crawford v. Hospitality Enters., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15774 at
*6 (E.D. LA, Aug. 16, 2002) (the court denying a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in a case involving a challenge to a supervisor’s discriminatory hiring practices,
where the supervisor specifically discriminated against “blacks with gold teeth, blacks
with braids, and blacks with jerry curls or greasy hair.”) (internal citation omitted).
135. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 37, at 1520, 1524.
136. See Davis v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., No. 91-CV-359E(M), 1994 WL 714517
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994). According to the court,
[A]s a matter of common sense and experience, that an employer would
dismiss a black employee and replace him or her with another black hardly
establishes (although it may be evidence of) an absence of discrimination.
For example, an employer might tolerate outspokenness in his white
employees but find objectionable a comparable lack of reserve by a black
employee because of a feeling that blacks should “know their place.” If his
solution is to fire the outspoken black in favor of a more docile or reserved
black employee, his action obviously still is discriminatory even though the
position was not filled by a “non-protected class member.” Other
conceivable employers might have a particular animus toward very dark-
complexioned black employees and thus replace them with light-
complexioned blacks. Again, discrimination is obvious even though the new
hires are black.
Id. at *4. Additionally, nonBlacks, are not the only groups which have expectations for
what it means to be the “right kind” of black employee. One recent Title VII case dealt
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Blacks have acquired elite educations and positions within the
workplace. These embedded notions about the constraints of blackness
appear to produce alternate permutations of the “right kind” of Black
phenomenon. For example, in his book about frustrated black
executives, Ellis Cose found that many black executives claimed that
companies steered them into dead-end “black” jobs, which involved
working in such areas as “community relations” or “minority affairs.”137
This phenomenon suggests that employers see even the highly qualified
Blacks they hire as only suitable for the “right kind” of positions.138 A
different version of companies investing in “black slots” is given effect
through what Professor Stephen Carter describes as the “best black”
syndrome.139 The syndrome essentially sets up a false choice between
diversity and quality.140 Those who practice this tactic will hire a black
applicant because he or she is perceived to be the best black applicant,
rather than the best applicant irrespective of race.141 While the practice
might be said to be the practical consequence of affirmative action, it is
actually grounded upon stereotypes that suggest that the best Blacks
cannot compete with the best Whites in the workforce.142 Such a practice
serves the ends of tokenism by ensuring that the best Black—he or she
being the finest the race has to offer—will also be the only Black.143
Taken together, these practices demonstrate how employers searching for
the right kind of black person for the “right kind of black position,” may
then limit their hiring of Blacks to a very discrete set of individuals,
whose promotion prospects will be limited.144
In other words, analyses in these cases and of employer treatment of
minority employees reveal a snapshot of a work world where employers
with a complaint, which might be understood to arise from a black employee not being
perceived as authentic or the “right kind” of black by her black supervisor. See Bryant v.
Begin Manage Program, 281 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. NY 2003) (the court denying
summary judgment in a case where a black woman claims she was replaced in her job
after her black supervisor had requested the employee to dress in a more “Afrocentric”
style, criticized the employee’s dyed, blonde hair, and referred to the employee as a
“wannabe”). Cf. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996)
(explaining how the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of discrimination under the ADEA, which
required that the person who replaced the plaintiff be under forty years old, created a safe
harbor in which employers could discriminate).
137. ELLIS COSE , THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 80-82 (1993).
138. This phenomenon may work in the reverse as well. For example, in a study
of the use of names as a screening device for temporary employment agencies in
California, researchers concluded that “White-sounding names may [have] cue[d]
positive stereotypes, especially regarding white male applicants, and result[ed] in fewer,
not greater, job opportunities” because white men were viewed as “‘too good’ or ‘not
appropriate’ for the [temporary] administrative office positions.” Names Make a
Difference, supra note 82, at 17.
139. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 49
(1991).
140. See id. at 51.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 50.
143. See id. at 50-52.
144. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 86, at 1672-73, 1675-76.
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fail to account for policies and actions that may work to limit
opportunities for racial minorities, or exclude certain types of racial
minorities altogether. Certainly, very little attention is paid to
discrimination in the workplace for minorities who are considered to be
the wrong kind of person of color or are viewed as simply too “ethnic.”
Part of the problem appears to be that courts rarely encounter claims
where plaintiffs specifically charge that they are being punished for
being the wrong type of person of color. Interestingly, in one such case
involving intraracial discrimination based on skin color, Sanders v.
District of Columbia, the court accepted as viable under Title VII a black
plaintiff’s claim that “her light-skinned black supervisors gave
preferential treatment to other light-skinned black employees, at the
expense of [the plaintiff], who [was] dark-skinned.”145 Although the
court recognized Ms. Sanders’ claim as viable under Title VII, the
court’s decision reveals that claims of intraracial discrimination are
difficult to prove. In dismissing Ms. Sanders’ claim the court explained
that she “adduced no credible evidence to substantiate [her claim], other
than the lone fact that both [the supervisor] and the. . .[colleague] who
was permitted to keep her position ha[d] lighter skin than Ms.
Sanders.”146 The court further pointed out that Ms. Sanders could
provide no evidence of “a single conversation, comment, or deed
showing either directly or indirectly that [the supervisor] or any other. .
.official was inclined to, or ever did, discriminate against dark-skinned
black individuals.”147
But given that people are rarely overtly discriminatory, is it likely
such evidence would exist? Would the court have accepted Ms. Sanders’
arguments had she also presented expert evidence about discrimination
against dark-skinned Blacks, along with evidence that her supervisor and
her replacement were both light-skinned? Or, returning to the findings of
Bertrand and Mullainathan’s study that are central to this Article, would
a black Jamal Jackson, unlike Ms. Sanders, be able to convince a court
that racial discrimination prevented his being hired for a job, where his
sole evidence would be that the only Blacks hired by the employer had
nonethnic-sounding names? Given how the courts have constructed the
operation of race and identity in previous cases, would the presentation
of such evidence really be accepted as supportive of a prima facie case?
145. No. 88-3614 SS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at *2-3 (D.D.C. June 4,
1991). The court based this decision on discussions of Title VII contained in the
Congressional Record and the ruling of another federal court, which previously held that
discrimination based on shades of skin color was actionable under Title VII. Id. at *7
n.1; see also Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“[A]
distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection.”); and Bland,
263 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (the plaintiff also alleging as part of her Title VII racial
harassment complaint that her supervisor, an African American judge, made derogatory
comments about dark-skinned African American women). The Title VII claim was
dismissed as the plaintiff was found not to be an “employee” within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 557.
146. Sanders, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at *7.
147. Id. at *8.
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The question becomes then: whether a court can really make a
determination about the import of color or intrarace status distinctions
without first complicating its understanding of race and identity. For
instance, in the Sanders case, one could argue that a more robust analysis
would require the court to situate the plaintiff’s claims within the context
of social science or normative evidence pertaining to the privileges that
accompany whiteness and lightness.148
Unlike the Sanders case, the more prevalent cases involving
intrarace distinctions typically involve courts deciding the import of an
employer’s ostensibly race- or color-neutral decisions, which serve to
disadvantage certain persons of color. For example, in Rogers v.
American Airlines, Inc., a district court completely disregarded the
possibility that the employer’s policy banning all braided hairstyles was
the result of an attempt to exclude not all Blacks,149 but the kind of Black
who is negatively stereotyped based on their wearing cornrow braids—in
148. In addition to the cases cited in supra note 145, see, e.g., KATHY RUSSELL
ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX: THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS
124-34 (1992) (discussing how within and outside the workplace context, black people
discriminate in favor of Blacks with lighter skin); Ronald Turner, The Color Complex:
Intraracial Discrimination in the Workplace, 46 LAB. L.J. 678 (1995) (discussing
intraracial workplace discrimination among Blacks); Harris, supra note 54, at 1724-45
(discussing the property-like qualities of whiteness or lightness); see also STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA 1-24 (1996) (identifying whiteness as one of the societal sources of systemic
privilege); Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does
Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and
Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 157-84 (1997) (examining the
hypothesis that lighter-skinned people of color experience less discrimination than those
who are darker-skinned); Hernandez, supra note 98, at 118 (describing the value of
whiteness to multiracial individuals as “an intrinsic part of an institutional racial
hierarchy in which the closer one can approximate whiteness, the better off one is
economically and socially”).
149. 527 F. Supp. 229, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The same conclusion was reached
in a similar suit brought against American Airlines seventeen years later. Cooper v.
American Airlines, No. 97-1901, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10426 (4th Cir. May 26, 1998)
(Court affirming the lower court dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, in a case involving an African American woman who filed Title VII
claims alleging intentional and disparate impact discrimination based upon race, where
she was reprimanded for wearing braids in violation of the company’s revised grooming
policy), See also McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996), discussed infra in notes 177-85 and accompanying text. For a
more recent case involving an African American challenging an ostensibly race-neutral
grooming policy, see Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2003). The policy
actually allowed braids, but not the dreadlocks the petitioner wore. Id. at 379. The
complaint, essentially alleged that the petitioner was being singled out for discrimination
because as one who practiced the Rastafarian religion, which necessitated the dreadlocks,
he was the wrong kind of black person. Unlike the Rogers plaintiff, Booth’s racial
discrimination claims were not brought under Title VII, but under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983. The Appellate court affirmed the dismissal of his Section 1981 claim, even where
Booth alleged that grooming standards were not enforced against Whites and some other
black employees. Id. at 383-84. Interestingly, the lower court’s dismissal of the Section
1983 claim was reversed and remanded because the lower court had erroneously held that
Booth was required to file this intentional discrimination claim under Title VII. Id. at
382-83.
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other words, one who is too “ethnic.” Again, the court failed to
recognize the ways in which the policy may have been premised upon a
more complex behavioral response to racial difference—in this case, the
improper reliance upon racial stereotyping as determined by a proxy for
race such as hairstyle.150 Relying solely on the concept of physical race,
the court dismissed the discrimination claim of the plaintiff, which was
based on a work policy that prohibited all braided hairstyles.151 In so
doing, the court held that unlike skin color, “[a]n all-braided hairstyle is
an ‘easily changed characteristic,’ and, even if socioculturally associated
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an
employer.”152 Additionally, the court reasoned that the policy was not
racially discriminatory because it applied equally to both Blacks and
Whites.153 Such reasoning, however, neglects an even more important
point about how race is socially constructed—in particular, the idea that
the policy that prohibited all braided hairstyles may not have only been a
means of excluding the “wrong kind” of Black but the “wrong kind” of
White, meaning a white person who would dare wear a “black” hairstyle
such as cornrows.154
As Rogers and the other “braids” cases suggest, federal courts have
consistently rejected claims filed by individual plaintiffs who have
alleged discrimination based on proxies for an impermissible trait
covered by antidiscrimination legislation, thereby neglecting the fact that
disfavored status is not merely about the physical but about how the
social identity of any particular group has been constructed.155 Indeed,
both prior to and since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,156 which involved an allegation of age
discrimination based on the use of pensions as a proxy for age,157 courts
have generally been resistant to using Title VII as a means of remedying
150. One “braids” case does seem to make this connection to how the policy is
actually being used by the employer. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 660-61
(6th Cir. 1999) (finding a Title VII disparate treatment claim was sustainable where an
unwritten, race-neutral hairstyle policy was differentially applied to a black female
employee).
151. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
152. Id. at 232.
153. See id.
154. Recently, a white teenage girl was sent home from school for wearing her
hair in cornrows. The headteacher asserted that her hair was “too extreme.” Deborah
Haile, School Bans “Wrong Race” Hairstyle, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://www.manchesteronline.co.uk/news/education/s/151/151512_school_bans_wrong_r
ace_hairstyle.html. A school official explained, “We don’t allow any extreme hairstyles
of any description at the school. We are a high-achieving school with high standards and
we don’t allow any street culture into school.” Id. Although in the United Kingdom, this
example of punishment for a white teenager who wore her hair in cornrows demonstrates
how in society even Whites are expected to perform their racial identity—in a way that
distances them from blackness.
155. Cf. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 717 (“The social meaning of being a
black woman is not monolithic and static but contextual and dynamic.”).
156. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
157. Id. at 606-07.
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discrimination by proxy.158 In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff, Walter
Biggins, filed a lawsuit under the ADEA, alleging that his age motivated
his employer’s decision to terminate him.159 Specifically, Biggins
claimed that his employer fired him just weeks before his pension vested
because the employer wanted to avoid any costs associated with his
pension.160 In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court held that
discharging an older employee to prevent his pension benefits from
vesting did not violate the ADEA where the vesting of the pension
benefits was based on years of service, a factor that merely correlated
with age.161 According to the Court, the ADEA was not enacted to
address decisions made by employers that were related to but not
necessarily based on age; instead, it was targeted at employment
decisions that were based upon stereotypes of older workers as
unproductive and incompetent.162
The effects of Hazen Paper on cases concerning discrimination
based on proxies, even those concerning race discrimination, have been
damaging despite the fact that the Supreme Court itself explained that its
decision should not preclude liability where an employer directly uses
pension status as a proxy for age.163 In numerous age discrimination
cases, federal courts have rejected plaintiffs’ proxy discrimination claims
on the ground that the challenged employment decision was not based on
misperceptions about the competence of older workers, but instead on
158. See infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
159. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 606.
160. Id. at 607. In support of his claim, Biggins highlighted the fact that his
employer offered to retain him as a consultant, a capacity in which he would not have
been entitled to receive pension benefits. Id.
161. Id. at 608-09, 611. For a discussion of the complications arising from the
Court’s handling of age-correlated factors or the “age proxy doctrine”, see Toni J.
Querry, Note, A Rose By Any Other Name No Longer Smells As Sweet: Disparate
Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 530 (1996). While allowing that employers should be able to act based
upon some factors which correlate with age, the article argues that correlations which
appear to defeat the congressional purpose of the ADEA – preventing employers from
“acting on inaccurate stereotypes about older workers’ abilities and productivity and
discriminating …’because of [their] age’”— must be prohibited. Id. at 566 (footnote
omitted).
162. Hazen Paper Co. , 507 U.S at 610-11. The Court recently reaffirmed its
belief that the general purpose of the ADEA was to protect older persons being
discriminated against due to age. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,
586 (2004). We recognize that there are distinctions between these age discrimination
cases and cases involving the use of an outside factor as a proxy for race; nonetheless, we
find the comparison to be useful.
163. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 612-13 (“We do not preclude the possibility
that an employer who targets employees with a particular pension status on the
assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age
discrimination.”); see also Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More
“Senior”) Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 392 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court “did not foreclose
the use of the proxy theory in all cases” after Hazen Paper).
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factors not covered by law.164 Such decisions by courts ignore a
number of important concerns about the dangers of discrimination based
on proxies, including the fact that even decisions made on correct
perceptions about older workers may be motivated by reasons that
contravene the purposes of antidiscrimination legislation.165
Moreover, such a limited analysis of discrimination has essentially
left a gaping hole in which employers may avoid liability for their
potentially discriminatory decisions and has extended into lawsuits
concerning race and national origin discrimination. For example, in
some instances, employers have relied on the proxy of voice or accent as
a means of excluding applicants from jobs.166 Although accent is
intrinsically intertwined with national origin, courts have consistently
held that accent may serve as a legitimate reason for not hiring an
individual if it can be shown to interfere with job performance.167
164. See Gen. Dynamics Sys., 540 U.S. at 592. But see EEOC v. Ceres
Terminals, Inc., No. 99C5320, 2001 WL 109811, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2001)
(distinguishing the plaintiffs’ lawsuit from Hazen Paper where the employees’ “receipt
of pension plan disbursements was directly correlated with age”); see also Huff v.
UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 388 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming a denial for a motion for
summary judgment where the pension plan was triggered by “a hybrid of age and years
of service”); Kiser v. Naperville Cmty. Unit, 227 F. Supp. 2d 954, 963-64 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (same).
165. For example, as Professor Michael Zimmer has explained, the Supreme
Court failed to acknowledge that “the employer [in Hazen Paper] might not have
discharged Biggins to prevent his pension from vesting if he had been much younger
because receipt of any pension benefits would have been so much further off.” Zimmer,
supra note 31, at 1901. Likewise, some courts have rejected claims under the ADEA
where the decision to fire older employers was partially based on the fact that older
workers tend to have more experience and thus cost more in terms of salaries and benefits
(a rather reliable perception of older workers). See Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119
F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997). According to these courts, even though older workers may
specifically be targeted by the employer’s actions, such decisions are not the result of
animus or misperceptions due to age, but rather the result of applying a neutral factor that
has some correlation to age. Id. For example, in Criley, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims under the
ADEA where there was evidence to “support an inference that Delta was reluctant to hire
pilots who would shortly be disqualified from piloting and might begin drawing pension
benefits” because “an employer’s concern about economic consequences of employment
decisions does not constitute age discrimination . . . even though there may be a
correlation with age.” Id.
166. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law,
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1348-57 (1991)
(analyzing Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989) and other incidents
where speakers of Hawaiian Creole, Korean, and other languages were discriminated
against in employment and other contexts based upon accents); Dawn L. Smalls,
Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 579, 580-82 (2004)
(discussing the negative effects within employment contexts of linguistic and ethnic
minorities having “non-standard dialects”).
167. See, e.g. , Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596-97 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1081 (1990) (asserting that the clerk must be able to communicate effectively with
the public where the clerk would be responsible for handling hundreds of daily inquiries);
Hou v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. Supp 1539 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (concluding that a
professor’s accent materially affected his performance in his job where there were student
complaints regarding difficulty in understanding him). But see Odima v. Westin Tucson
Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that accent was an improper basis for an
35
Additionally, although language and national origin are often
intertwined, courts have held that employers may discharge employees
for speaking languages other than English in the workplace even if it
does not affect their job performance.168 In essence, while there are
certainly instances in which accent or speaking a different language may
clearly hinder performance on a job, courts have created a space in which
employers may be able to hide any prejudices they may have toward
certain ethnic groups by invoking an English-only rule or
communication-skills requirement, even when such factors may be
helpful but not necessary to effective performance on the job.169
Indeed, such race- and ethnicity-based motives on behalf of
employers, even if unconscious, can be inferred from the fact that such
issues tend to arise only when employers are dealing with the accents of
and languages spoken by people who speak Spanish and rarely against
those with British or other European accents.170 For example, in Garcia
v. Gloor,171 the Fifth Circuit upheld an employer’s ban on Spanish-
speaking in the workplace where Spanish-speaking sales employees were
actually expected to speak Spanish to Spanish-speaking customers, who
made up seventy-five percent of the employer’s customer base. Noting
that the plaintiff “was hired by [the employer] precisely because he was
bilingual,”172 the Fifth Circuit held that the employer had not
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of national origin because
Title VII “does not prohibit all arbitrary employment practices”173 and
because “English-speaking customers [had] objected to communications
between employees that they could not understand;”174 a feeling that
several scholars have explained can be attributed to prejudices against
Latinos and perceptions of Latinos as perpetual foreigners.175 In essence,
employment decision where the plaintiff testified for several hours at trial and the court
understood him).
168. See Perea, supra note 13, at 808 & n.15.
169. See Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596. The court observed that,
Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many
cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context for an employer
unlawfully discriminating against someone based on national origin to state
falsely that it was not the person’s national origin that caused the
employment or promotion problem, but the candidate’s inability to measure
up to the communications skills demanded by the job.
Id.; see also Matsuda, supra note 166, at 1350-57 (claiming that courts are too willing to
accept explanations for accent discrimination that are rooted in prejudice without
questioning whether an accent renders the speaker nonfunctional for a particular job).
170. Johnson & Martínez, supra note 20, at 1251-52, 1268-70.
171. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
172. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 267.
175. See generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins
Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal
Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (discussing discrimination against Latinos in
the context of bilingualism and English-only rules); Steven W. Bender, Direct
Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship Between Language Law Rhetoric and the
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although restrictions or decisions based on accent and language not
only correlate highly with national origin, but also for many employers,
signal national origin or, more importantly, carry with them negative
social meanings based on race and ethnicity, federal courts do not
generally recognize claims challenging language and accent restrictions
under Title VII. As explained by the court in Garcia, “neither the statute
nor common understanding equates national origin with the language
that one chooses to speak.”176
Additionally, courts have indicated that they would reject similar
proxy discrimination claims filed by applicants to a temporary
employment agency if they alleged that they were discriminated against
because of race where hairstyle was used as a proxy for blackness.177 For
example, in McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., the plaintiff, Corrine McBride,
filed a lawsuit alleging that her employer terminated her in retaliation for
challenging what she considered to be the agency’s discriminatory policy
of not referring qualified applicants with braided hairstyles for
employment positions.178 McBride believed that the agency’s policy was
simply a means of excluding Blacks from work through the agency,179 or
as some scholars would clarify, of precluding a particular type of Black
from participation.180 Soon after McBride threatened to complain about
the agency’s grooming policy to the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission (EEOC), she was fired by her employer for unprofessional
conduct.181 In reviewing a motion to dismiss McBride’s claim of
retaliation under Title VII, the district court granted the motion on the
ground that McBride’s retaliation claim was viable only if she
complained about an unlawful employment practice.182 It then held that
an employer’s refusal to place applicants with braided hairstyles into jobs
did not constitute an unlawful employment practice.183 In other words,
much like the situation in Hazen Paper,184 the court held that, while there
may be a correlation between ethnic hairstyle and race or national origin,
Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 145, 157 (1997) (discussing
how the English-only movement is “fueled by prejudice against and fear of Latinos/as”).
176. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268.
177. McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 19, 1996); see also supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Rogers, Cooper and Booth discrimination claims, which were also premised upon
hairstyle); Caldwell, supra note 20, at 366 (discussing the Rogers case and describing
discrimination of this type as “widespread and longstanding”).
178. McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *1.
179. See id.
180. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 723 (“[S]hould the firm not hire
[Toney], it will not be because Toney is black in a phenotypic sense. . . . Instead, the
decision will be based on the kind of black person the firm perceives Toney to be—that
is, the individualized social meaning of Toney’s black identity.”).
181. McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *1.
182. Id. at *1-3.
183. Id. at *2.
184. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
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such styles were not tantamount to race and thus were not an unlawful
basis for making hiring or other employment decisions.185
Overall, the treatment of proxy discrimination cases in federal
courts falls in line with the failure of courts to evaluate race
discrimination cases in a manner that recognizes the complexities of
racism and race discrimination.186 Indeed, the courts’ treatment of such
cases often fails to acknowledge that race discrimination against an
individual may involve unfair or differential treatment based upon a mere
perception of a person’s race—in other words, disparate treatment based
upon racial stereotyping due to a trait, factor, or quality that is considered
to belong to persons of a particular race.187 In sum, current
interpretations of race-based antidiscrimination employment laws depart
from an understanding of race that acknowledges the social meanings of
race, in particular what blackness or other markers for racial or ethnic
identity signify on the job market and in society.188
185. See McBride, 1996 WL 755779 at *2.
186. See Houh, supra note 14, at 464 (“[A]ntidiscrimination laws have reified
marginalization, powerlessness, and/or cultural imperialism by failing to address in any
substantive way ‘the social process by which the results of work and work itself are
appropriated.’”); see also Aaron Celious & Daphna Oyserman, Race from the Inside: An
Emerging Heterogeneous Race Model, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 149 (2001) (quoting
LAWRENCE O. GRAHAM, OUR KIND OF PEOPLE 5 (2000)), which claimed that persons
working with racial identity theories “typically handle race as a simple Black-White
dichotomy that overlooks within-group heterogeneity, substituting a subgroup—young,
low socioeconomic status, darker skinned men—for all African Americans”). But see El-
Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding valid a claim under
federal discrimination law based upon an employer’s insistence on modifying an
employee’s ethnic-sounding name); supra note 19 (discussing the Orhorhaghe and
Pilliod immigration discrimination cases in which courts recognized the use of names as
proxies for national origin).
187. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, in
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 62-65
(Robert Post ed., 2001) (noting that dominant society ascribes traits and behaviors to
certain groups, generally assumes all group members have the assigned characteristics,
then acts with false beliefs leading to societal discrimination against group members).
188. See Jones, supra note 84, at 1494-95 (“In the United States, being White
generally means that one has access to the psychological and economic privileges of
Whiteness. Being Black generally means that one is pegged lower in the socioeconomic
hierarchy.”).
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III.WHY TITLE VII SHOULD APPLY EVEN IF LAKISHA AND JAMAL ARE
WHITE: IMPORTING THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG OF THE ADA INTO
TITLE VII CASE ANALYSIS 189
As this Article demonstrates, individuals are not only discriminated
against on the job market because of animus toward their racial group as
defined by phenotype, but also because they are perceived, whether
consciously or unconsciously, as belonging to a particular racial group
and as having the negative qualities linked to stereotypes of that group.
For instance, an individual, whether or not he or she actually is black,
may be discriminated against because he or she is perceived to be or
“regarded as” black (meaning what it socially means to be black) based
upon a proxy for blackness.190
Even though this article proposes a methodology for dealing
with the innovation of proxy discrimination, it is arguable that there is
nothing in Title VII that would prevent courts from regulating this type
of conduct as traditional disparate treatment discrimination. The basic
differences between proxy discrimination and more typical forms of
discrimination under Title VII have to do with the methods of
discrimination and the cognitive processes or steps involved. Whereas
traditionally, intentional forms of race discrimination have involved face-
to-face encounters, which confirm through physical characteristics the
victim’s membership in the protected class to which negative social
stereotypes are attached, proxy discrimination operates without the
189. Two scholars once posed the following provocative questions:
Should women or African-Americans claim they are victims of
discrimination on the basis of disability – because they are regarded as
being physically or mentally impaired in the performance of major life
activities – rather than on the basis of race or sex? At first, the question
seems insulting, suggesting as it does, that there is something aberrant or
defective about not being male or white. Or perhaps the question is merely
pointless: if federal civil rights laws broadly prohibit discrimination of the
basis or race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability – and they do
– then what difference does it make how we categorize forbidden conduct?
Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1996). While the article goes on to treat the
questions as largely rhetorical, and instead, focuses on similarities and differences
between the ADA and preexisting antidiscrimination statutes, it introduces the beginnings
of an idea that we explicitly and substantively explore in this Part of our Article.
190. It is not our intent to place too much emphasis on the admittedly rare
instances where non-Blacks with African American-sounding names will become the
victims of discrimination. We understand that it is African Americans who bear the
greatest burden of this type of discrimination based upon having black-sounding names.
Our goal is to illuminate the power and prevalence of the negative construction of race
that the name is a proxy for. This skewed understanding of race and how individuals
learn to discriminate based upon it is so powerful that it prevents employers from seeing
that they are also eliminating potentially acceptable nonblack candidates. The alternate
and equally devastating conclusion is that the race bias is so strong that employers intend
to discriminate against non-Blacks with African American-sounding names, because the
name is enough to taint such applicants with the social stigma of blackness.
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requirement of any such interaction or confirmation. Instead, proxy
discrimination involves the one added step of using some other marker as
an indicator of physical characteristics or group membership, to which
negative stereotypes are then associated with, prior to discrimination. It
is not outlandish to suggest that, even with these differences in the
operation of the conduct, proxy discrimination simply is race-based
discrimination.191 The problem, however, arises in convincing federal
courts of this fact; courts hearing antidiscrimination claims have been
reluctant to regulate behaviors premised upon traits that highly correlate
with, but do not necessarily implicate, protected categories.
Given the trend in Title VII case law, a black plaintiff with an
African American-sounding name who sent a résumé to a prospective
employer could not state a claim for race discrimination even if she could
show that an applicant with a similar résumé but a white-sounding name
received a callback and she did not. The black plaintiff’s claim would
likely fail in federal courts on the ground that the two factors, name and
race, while highly correlated, are not equivalent. Likewise, if a white
plaintiff filed a claim asserting that she was not given a callback because
“she sounded too black,”192 her claim would likely fail even if the
employer admitted that the sound of the applicant’s voice was the reason
for the decision. The reasoning would be that discriminating against
someone because they “sound black” is not discrimination on the basis of
an impermissible trait and therefore is not covered by Title VII.
Such rulings by federal courts, however, would be misguided
because they would essentially eviscerate one of the purposes of Title
VII—to combat decisions based upon negative stereotypes associated
with particular racial groups.193 They would fail to acknowledge the fact
that discrimination based upon race actually encompasses discrimination
based upon social meanings of race—that is, what it means to be
perceived as black, whether one is or is not actually black.194 Moreover,
these holdings by courts would actually fly in the face of the Supreme
Court’s actual words in Hazen Paper, where the Court specifically noted
191. 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
192. See Wiehl, supra note 103, at 194 (identifying a study that showed that a
white male, who “had adopted the style and speech associated with African Americans,”
was incorrectly identified as black ninety-two percent of the time).
193. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)
(discussing an employer’s reliance on “subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” related
to race and describing the conduct as the type of harm “that Title VII was enacted to
combat”). Or as Professor Samuel Bagenstos has surmised, “ [I]t should be clear that the
goals of antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements [of the ADA] are parallel,
for both seek to dismantle a system of group-based subordination and the patterns of
occupational segregation that support that system.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational
Discrimination,” Accommodation and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L.
REV. 825, 857 (2003) (discussing the “normative equivalence” of the requirements of
traditional antidiscrimination and accommodation statutes) (emphasis in original).
194. Thomas A. Mayes, Confronting Same-Sex, Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment: Recommendations for Educators and Policy Makers, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
641, 648 (2001) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) for the
proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court has long made clear that Congress enacted Title
VII in part to combat differential treatment based on sex stereotypes” (footnote omitted)).
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that it did not intend to “preclude the possibility that an employer who
targets employees with a particular [feature] on the assumption that these
employees are likely to [belong to a certain group] thereby engages in. .
.discrimination.”195 As the Supreme Court explained in Hazen Paper, an
employer may have discriminated against an individual where the
employer has “suppose[d] a correlation between two factors and act[ed]
accordingly.”196
If nothing else, Hazen Paper and the purposes of Title VII indicate
that claims brought by an individual who has experienced discrimination
because he or she was “regarded as” belonging to a certain race should
fall under the protection of Title VII.197 The intricacies of borrowing
such language would have to be worked through, because not even the
ADA provides a blanket correction for merely wrongly identifying
someone as disabled. The ADA provides relief for persons who are
disabled or “regarded as” having a disability,198 and defines disability as
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of [an] individual.”199 This language supports
granting relief where an employer mistakenly believes that someone is
disabled or where an employer believes that an actual impairment, which
is nonlimiting, is substantially limiting. Using the ADA’s definition of
disability, courts have concluded that the ADA encompasses claims by
people who are “regarded as” disabled and discriminated against as a
result of a false perception of disability and unfounded stereotypes about
persons with disabilities.200
It should be acknowledged that there are both challenges and limits
to courts’ looking to the “regarded as” language of the ADA in deciding
Title VII cases. As a practical matter, one wishing to derail such an
approach could simply argue that because the “regarded as” language
does not appear in Title VII, courts should not be able to consider the
approach without a statutory amendment. While such an amendment
would be ideal, there is nothing that prevents a court from using doctrinal
analyses and understandings from other antidiscrimination statutes to
assist in understanding the operation of discriminatory conduct within
the Title VII context.201 The turn to the “regarded as” prong need not be
195. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993). Hazen Paper
specifically addresses this possibility in terms of pensions and age discrimination, but the
statement is easily applied to all forms of proxy discrimination.
196. Id. at 613.
197. This would include both the claims of Blacks who are correctly identified as
such and perceived to be the wrong kind of Black, and Whites who are falsely identified
as Blacks, because in both cases the discrimination is premised upon race—employers
attempting to keep the workplace free of persons who through name, speech, or other
ascribed trait come to be associated with races that have been constructed to be less
socially acceptable.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(c) (2000).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(a) (2000).
200. See, e.g., Seifken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.
1995).
201. In fact courts have looked to Title VII as a framework for structuring causes
of action under the ADA. See Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1095
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understood as literal, but can be encouraged as an intellectual tool to
assist the court in answering the critical question: “How is discrimination
working?” The importance of the specific language is that it could
support an emboldened court’s claim that Congress understands that
minority identity categories or perceived impairments are given power
through social constructions and understandings.
Setting the specific language to one side, however, a more general
look at the ADA can assist a court in realizing how proxy discrimination
might be understood to be discrimination based upon or “because of”
one’s protected status. For example, perhaps the absurdity of tolerating
proxy discrimination within the Title VII context would be exposed by
asking whether a court would ever allow an employer to argue that they
were not discriminating based on a person’s disability, but on the fact
that they used a wheelchair. The analogy is extreme, but the point is that
it is likely that courts would be very skeptical if employers were to
engage in Title VII-like proxy discrimination within the ADA context.
Additionally, referring back to the way that same-race (or intra-group)
decisions or color choices can operate to protect employers within a Title
VII analysis,202 it seems very unlikely that courts would similarly allow
an employer who discriminated against a person with a severe mobility
impairment to claim they should not be held liable because they
subjectively did not regard the individual as impaired.203
The absence of statutory “regarded as” language in Title VII is
not the only problem with direct application of the “regarded as” prong
to proxy discrimination. In the ADA context, the language protects
persons from being wrongly identified as belonging to the category of
persons who are impaired. Within the context of this Article, such a
similar categorical misidentification would attach only to a white
Lakisha or Jamal. For the great many job applicants with black-sounding
names, the employer is correctly identifying their category. The
(7th Cir. 1998) (In assessing whether the complainant had established a discriminatory
retaliation claim under the ADA, the court opined “the case law of Title VII serves as a
useful guide because its proscription against retaliation is quite comparable to the
ADA's.”). In addition, federal law has created some explicit procedural overlap between
the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000). Section 12117(a) of the ADA states:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 705, 706, 707,
709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be the powers, remedies,
and procedures this title provides to the Commission, to the Attorney
General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of any provision of this Act [the ADA] . . . .
202. See supra notes 42-45 (discussing how courts have rejected claims based on
race or color, where employees claim they believed the disfavored employee belonged to
the same identity group as the selected employee).
203. Interestingly, at least Justice Thomas has attempted to import the Title VII
limits stemming from intragroup decisions into an ADA analysis. Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581, 616-22 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the majority rejected Justice
Thomas’ argument that would have ostensibly required the plaintiffs to allege some
disparate treatment as compared to nondisabled persons. See id. at 557 n.10. For an
excellent discussion of the issues surrounding this case, see Carlos A. Ball, Looking for
Theory in all the Rights Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability
Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 152-56 (2005).
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operation of misidentification or the use of misinformation on the part
of the employer is different in Title VII proxy cases than it is under the
ADA. The employers are, however, for all applicants, perceiving
impairment based on the assigned category—blackness—where no such
impairment exists. In other words, the point is not to suggest a direct and
literal application of the ADA’s use of the “regarded as” provision, but to
emphasize what the provision represents—an understanding that
discrimination takes place through assignments of individuals to
categories, that convey lower social status. Black and white Lakishas
and Jamals are being assigned to a category that is viewed as
debilitated—ethnically named Blacks who employers understand to be
deficient or unsuitable based on social understandings of blackness.
In addition to textual and structural differences, there is also the
matter of limitations that have been placed on the “regarded as” language
within the context of the ADA. The congressional testimony related to
whether the ADA could regulate discrimination based upon genetic
information included an argument that a perceived impairment cannot be
disconnected from the requirement that said impairment “substantially
limit a major life activity.”204 That record suggested that the “regarded
as” language would not pertain where a covered employer regarded the
supposed impaired person as merely not capable of performing some
types of work.205 Only a belief that the disabled person was completely
incapable of working would satisfy the “substantially limit[ed] in a major
life activity” standard.206
204. Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing on Examining Issues
Relating to the Development of Federal Policy Governing the Treatment of an
Individual’s Genetic Information in the Workplace in Light of the Recent Human Genome
Project Breakthroughs Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
106th Cong. 63-69 (2000) (Statement of Harold P. Coxson, Esq., relating to genetic
information discrimination in the workplace) [hereinafter Hearing]. Interestingly,
Professor Bagenstos has proposed that nothing in the ADA suggests that the “regarded as
having [a substantially limiting] impairment” prong has to be viewed through the eyes of
the employer; requiring courts to take notice of the perceived impaired person’s
perception of events might be a way to mitigate the “major life activities” limitations.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
446-48 (2000). In making the claim, he provides a helpful analogy that suggests a
restaurant owner who would deny service to a person with a disfiguring skin condition,
where such a person accurately perceived they were being “regarded as” disabled by
patrons, should be given a remedy under the ADA, just as a black patron would be given
a remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, if they were denied service based on the
complaints of bigoted patrons.) Id. at 447-48.
205. Id. at 68.
206. Id.; see, e.g., EEOC v. General Electric Company, 17 F. Supp. 2d 824, 831
(N.D. Ind. 1998) (denying that plaintiff had been “regarded as” disabled where the
defendant falsely believed plaintiff was infected with HIV and harassed him upon this
basis, but plaintiff had failed to establish the defendant believed HIV infection
substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to work or engage in another major life
activity); Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1098 (upholding termination of manager who refused to
follow a direction to reassign an employee who lacked many teeth from contact with the
public as reasonable and concluding that the employee would not be “regarded as”
disabled since her impairment was not substantially limiting within the meaning of the
ADA); and McCollough v. Atlantic Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp. 1489, 1496-98 (N.D. GA
1996) (Court dismissing the plaintiff’s claim where it decided that the employer did
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The congressional testimony is bolstered by the decision in a
Supreme Court case that considered the effect of the “regarded as”
disabled language in the ADA. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. the
Court accepted that the ADA protects those who are merely “regarded
as” being disabled, but not where the availability of corrective measures
would result in the presumably impaired being able to function
identically to those without impairments.207 The case and the
applicability of its holding within the Title VII context will be discussed
more fully below.208 Here, the important finding to take from the case is
the Court’s determination that the “regarded as” prong is nullified where
there is no proof that the employer believed that the presumed
impairment substantially limited the claimants in the major life activity
of working.209 As proof for this supposition, the Court noted that there
were several other types of positions that poorly sighted pilots would
have been able to perform at the airline.210
Despite the Court’s tendency to narrow the class of individuals
protected under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability
definition, the previously referenced congressional testimony expressed
support for the Sutton Court’s acknowledgement that the object of the
ADA is to prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities and
that the “regarded as” prong of the statute is necessary to prevent
employers from making decisions based upon “myths, fears, or
stereotypes.”211 In reviewing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the
predecessor to the ADA’s “regarded as” prong), the Supreme Court
explained in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, “society’s
accumulated myths and fears about the disability and disease [can be] as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.”212
Based upon the above cases and definitions, it is quite clear that
Title VII and the ADA share a common goal—eradicating the effects of
regard the plaintiff as disabled and unable to do his assigned job, but where the
impairment did not extend to preventing the plaintiff from working in other (any) jobs) .
207. 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (deciding an ADA discrimination claim where
pilots claimed that they were “regarded as” disabled based upon their impaired vision that
was correctable with the use of glasses or contact lenses). For an extended analysis of
this element of the Court’s decision, see Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 514-19 (praising
the court’s recognition that the “regarded as” prong was intended to remedy the effects of
stereotyping, but criticizing the Court’s failure to understand that in our society,
stigmatized individuals are understood to lack ability, more generally).
208. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
209. Sutton , 527 U.S. at 491-92; see also Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1097 & n.13
(“We do not mean to imply that facial disfigurement, including facial disfigurement
caused by dental problems, can never be a disability for purposes of the ADA. Such an
impairment can be so severe as to limit, or be perceived as limiting, the employee in a
major life activity.”).
210. Id. at 493.
211. Hearing , supra note 204, at 68.
212. 180 U.S. 273, 275, 284 (1987).
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negative social constructions of outsider identities.213 Professor
Michael Stein addresses this commonality when he argues that majority
society views minority workers along a continuum of “physical
atypicality” where women, African Americans, and the physically
disabled are all atypical.214 Society, he further contends, is merely
slowest to adjust to persons with those differences with which it is least
familiar.215 It is this shared experience of society using “markers” as a
shorthand for ascribed otherness that supports broadening Title VII to
cover lawsuits based upon the improper use of race-based proxies.
Indeed, such protection is necessary to further Title VII’s goal of
eliminating the use of improper stereotypes pertaining to people who
belong to certain racial groups.
Although the ADA may differ from Title VII in a number of
ways,216 it does not differ from Title VII in its purpose of stamping out
employment decisions based purely on the social meanings attached to
membership in a marginalized group.217 For this reason, it makes sense
213. The major policy justification for antidiscrimination laws, whether they are
designed to protect racial minorities or the disabled, are to remedy the injuries arising
from the social stigma. Bagenstos, supra note 193, at 841 (arguing that across categories
of difference, the goal of antidiscrimination laws is to mitigate the social inequality of
subordinated group members). See also Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 426 (arguing that
the ADA is premised upon the notion of the disabled as an identifiable class of
individuals that “shares a common experience of systematic prejudice, stereotypes and
neglect.”); and Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note 189, at 5-11 (1996) (noting that with
the exception that the ADA provides for reasonable accommodation, that the central
prohibitions of the ADA are borrowed, directly or indirectly, from Title VII and that both
statutes measure discrimination by looking to how employers to treat the similarly
situated and those who are different).
214. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 583-84 (2004).
215. Id.
216. See Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 977-78 (2003)
(asserting that Congress took different approaches to remedying race and disability
discrimination, in that failure of employers to provide disabled persons preferential
treatment may be considered discrimination under the ADA, but Title VII has no such
provision); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
642, 648 (2001) (Discussing accommodation requirements of the ADA and asserting that,
“Even if the standard of intent is somewhat different under the disparate treatment branch
of Title VII (and it is not clear whether it is), it is clear that no existing Title VII
precedent has found disparate treatment liability for behavior that is the Title VII
analogue of neglecting the distinctive building-access circumstances of individuals with
disabilities.”) (footnote omitted); Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note 189, at 3 (“[Under
the civil rights statutes that protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can
complain of discrimination against them , but the cannot insist upon discrimination in
their favor”) (footnote omitted); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 618-
22 (2001) (articulating statutory differences and claiming that while courts have
borrowed from Title VII analysis for ADA cases, discrimination based on disability,
which is often unintentional, is very different from race and gender discrimination, which
are often based on use of stereotypes or deliberate malfeasance).
217. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 2003) (asserting
that the enactment of the ADEA was not in response to “dislike or intolerance of the
older worker . . . [but] arbitrary age discrimination—namely explicit age limitations—
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that antidiscrimination law concerning race discrimination, like that
concerning disability discrimination, should include a means of
evaluating claims where a person is “regarded as” being black or as
belonging to any particular race in the hiring market.
The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against qualified
individuals with a disability.218 Under the ADA, a plaintiff is disabled,
and thus entitled to protection, if: (1) she shows that she has a disability
as defined by the statute, meaning she is substantially limited in
performing one or more major life activities; (2) she shows that she has a
record of having such disability; or (3) she shows that she was regarded
as disabled by her employer.219 Returning to the Sutton case, with
respect to the “regarded as” prong of the ADA, the Supreme Court
explained there are two ways in which a plaintiff may fall within the
statutory definition of being “regarded as” disabled: “(1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”220 These two
methods of proving discrimination are recognized because of an
understanding that people are affected by negative and often mistaken
stereotypes about the capabilities of disabled people.221
These same factors and principles can and should be transferred to
an analysis of “regarded as” in disparate treatment race discrimination
cases. For example, the second method for proving disability
discrimination, where one is “regarded as” disabled because of an actual,
nonlimiting impairment, would essentially be similar to having a black
plaintiff, who was discriminated against either because of an African
American-sounding name or a black-sounding voice, bring a claim
alleging race discrimination based on his or her actual race, which was
perceived as limiting his or her ability due to negative stereotypes such
as black incompetence or laziness, but was mistakenly perceived as
being lazy and incompetent. Likewise, the first method for proving
based on misconceptions about the abilities of older workers”); Ross v. Campbell Soup
Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The breadth of the [ADA’s] protection is the
embodiment of its drafters’ will to stamp out the stereotyping of and discrimination
against persons with disabilities in all their forms, even when that stereotyping or
discrimination is misplaced.”).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 478 (1999).
220. Sutton , 527 U.S. at 489.
221. Statement of Representative Tony Coelho (Sept. 27, 1988), Legislative
History of Pub. L. 101-336, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Vol. 2, at 942-43 (Dec.
1990) (“when a program, or a job, or a school, has excluded disabled people, or
segregated them in a separate facility, this has been justified through the unchallenged
myth of equating disability with inability . . . . Equating disability with inability is false.
In employment, for example, numerous studies have shown that employment for the
disabled is restricted more by misconceptions, stereotypes, and generalizations about
handicaps, unfounded fears about increased costs and decreased productivity, and
outright prejudice, than by people’s disabilities themselves.”).
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disability discrimination, where one was “regarded as” disabled
because the “covered entity mistakenly believe[d] that”222 the plaintiff
had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, would
essentially be similar to having a white plaintiff, who was discriminated
against either because of an African American-sounding name or a
black-sounding voice, file a lawsuit claiming race discrimination on the
ground that he or she was mistakenly believed to be black and therefore
“regarded as” having all the negative qualities and stereotypes that are
generally associated with Blacks, even though the plaintiff was not
actually black.
This direct application of ADA language and case law, however, is
not perfect. As we discussed above, there are times where it is possible
that a person could regard someone as impaired but not trigger the
ADA.223 This seems much less likely within the Title VII context, where
the presupposition about race and its import would appear to be almost
per se violative of the statute. While the statutes may not necessarily
operate precisely the same, it still makes sense to attempt to regulate the
underlying offending behaviors in both race and disability-based
decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Prior to concluding, we want to acknowledge that while it is critical
that courts begin to grapple with how the socially constructed nature of
race shapes discrimination within employment and other contexts,
importing the ADA’s “regarded as” language into Title VII represents
only one methodological starting point for beginning to address the
problem. Given the scope and nature of problems related to societal
understandings of race and identity, the approach is neither a panacea nor
a solution free of problems. We recognize there are challenges that
result from borrowing the ADA’s “regarded as” language. For instance,
the recognition of proxy claims could significantly increase the bases
upon which claimants could file causes of actions. Additionally,
although Bertrand and Mullainathan’s research provided a starting place
for analyzing the labor market costs of behaviors premised upon social
constructions of race, the research was limited only to exploring the
disadvantages associated with African American-sounding names. As
other research and our analysis in this paper suggests, proxy
222. Sutton , 527 U.S. at 489.
223. In the Sutton case, the Supreme Court used diabetics as an example of
persons with a condition that could be considered a disability under certain
circumstances, but is not necessarily so under the ADA. Id. at 483-84; see also Tory L.
Lucas, Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its
Interaction with Other Federal Laws, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 871, 884 (2005) (discussing
EEOC guidelines and stating that just because a person qualifies as having a “serious
health condition” under the Family and Medical Leave Act that does not mean that they
are regarded as disabled under the ADA).
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discrimination is not just an issue of white on black discrimination.224
There will be complications for Title VII “regarded as” claims, which
may arise outside the context of the black-white binary understanding of
race.
First, as we have discussed, names are merely one method of
approximating a job candidate’s ascribed “otherness.” We have covered
other bases for discrimination, such as accents or speech vernacular.225
We have not thoroughly covered how markers that may correlate with
race, such as credit history,226 education,227 or geography228 (residing in,
224. See supra notes 82, 108-14, 165-75 and accompanying text. The tendency
of scholars to focus far too much of the racial discourse upon how race operates in the
context of black-white social relations, thereby obscuring the lived experiences of the
many other minority identity groups, is typically referred to as the black-white binary
paradigm. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
“Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL . L. REV. 1213, 1214-15 (1997)
(demonstrating the existence of the paradigm and how it operates to exclude Latinos from
inclusion in racial discourse); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race
Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1200-03 (2004) (discussing the
uniqueness of the black experience with racism and white power within the context of
multiracial politics, but ultimately concluding that an overemphasis on the black-white
binary paradigm unacceptably hinders the racial discourse); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s
Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship and the Black-White
Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1196-1200 (1997) (book review) (discussing the doctrinal
and practical consequences of the paradigm and arguing that as a symbol it stands for the
premise that Blacks are the only oppressed group that deserves to have its racial
grievances addressed); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 248-50 (1995) (describing the binary
paradigm as a type of “bipolar essentialism” and discussing its effect on Asian
Americans).
225. See supra notes 14, 102-23 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Latinos
might be understood to have claims based on multiple traits, meaning they could
potentially claim discrimination based on race, ethnicity and national origin.
226. See supra note 56. The same claim could really be made for any income-
related distinction or category, as many minority groups are disproportionately poor. See
Beck, supra note 20 (discussing Section 8 status as linked to income level, which may be
a proxy for race and other protected classes); Rachel Rubey, There’s No Place Like
Home: Housing for the Most Vulnerable Individuals with Severe Mental Disabilities, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1736-38 (2002) (noting that courts have upheld discrimination based
on minimum income requirements for renting in the private housing market, which in
effect legitimates discrimination against the mentally disabled in housing since they are
disproportionately low-income individuals).
227. For instance, attendance at a historically black college or university breaks
down heavily along racial lines and one might expect that for some employers, seeing
references to Spelman or Morehouse colleges on a résumé, might be tantamount to seeing
the names Lakisha or Jamal.
228. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of
Segregation: “Hewing a Stone of Hope From a Mountain of Despair,” 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1233, 1235-36 (1995) (discussing the racialization of space: “the process by which
residential location and community are carried and placed on racial identity” and noting
“I take my meaning from Susan Smith, who characterizes the term to be ‘the process by
which residential location is taken as an index of the attitudes, values, behavioural
inclinations and social norms of the kinds of people who are assumed to live [there]’”
(citing Susan J. Smith, Residential Segregation and the Politics of Racialization, in
RACISM, THE CITY AND THE STATE 128, 133 (Malcolm Cross & Michael Keith eds.,
1993))). Society then uses such information to perfect practices such as red-lining—“a
discriminatory practice by banks or insurance companies whereby the potential customer
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or hailing from a neighborhood or area with a significant minority
population) can be used in a similar fashion. It is not even possible to
construct a comprehensive list of all of the conditions or behaviors that
constitute proxies. Borrowing the “regarded as” language would likely
result in proxy cases significantly expanding the Title VII docket.229
This result is somewhat unavoidable. Part of the development of proxy
discrimination jurisprudence would necessarily involve discerning
between which types of ascriptive traits most highly correlate with race
and the other protected Title VII categories.230 Moreover, it would
require more work for administrative agencies and courts that adjudicate
employment discrimination claims, but it would also force these entities
to come to grips with the way racism (and other –isms) are often
practiced—unconsciously and through proxies.
Beyond the challenges associated with the myriad types of proxies
that exist, there will be issues arising from the fact that not all races are
similarly socially or legally constructed. Again, various studies allowed
us to explore the harmful consequences of blackness, a racial category
for which negative societal stereotypes are prevalent.231 Being “regarded
is denied a loan or insurance coverage because of the neighborhood in which the subject
property is located.” Terry W. Gentle, Jr., Comment, Rethinking Conciliation under the
Fair Housing Act, 67 TENN. L. REV. 425, 442 n.129 (2000).
229. This result alone may be a reason why courts seem extremely hesitant to
adopt such a remedy. Although as one scholar has pointed out, even if the doctrine gains
a foothold, courts find ways to effectively limit “litigation explosions” in the area of race-
related discrimination claims. See Brooks, supra note 42, at 14-15 (alleging that, in
response to increased filings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), courts found ways to limit
the effectiveness of the filings).
230. As one scholar has asserted, proxies essentially serve as a type of social
short-hand for marking group difference, and not all proxies are bad: “Employers (like
everyone else) treat individuals as members of groups all the time; we could not manage
all of the information in the world if we did not act on the basis of proxies”. Bagenstos,
supra note 193, at 855 (citation omitted). The goal of this Article is to make real the
author’s additional claim that “antidiscrimination law bracket[] out one set of proxies
(those based on race, gender, and the other forbidden classifications) and prohibit[]
employers from relying on the proxies in that set.” Id. at 865 (citation omitted). While
empirical data of the type discussed in this article can be helpful to legal decision-makers,
such evidence will not exist for many proxy categories. Part of the challenge to
implementing the proxy discrimination cause of action will be in the courts’ ability to
“know it when they see it.” See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (making the same comment, somewhat in jest, about pornography).
231. Within the context of a discussion of the crippling effects of racial
stereotypes, Professor Jodi Armour has referred to the consequences of such stereotypes
as a type of “black tax” or “the price Black people pay for their encounters with Whites
(and some Blacks) because of Black stereotypes.” JODY D. ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND
REASONABLE RACISM : THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13 (1997). The
breadth of such costs is astutely captured in the following passage:
Race, gender and disability stereotypes are not likely to be idiosyncratic
to a particular employer, nor are they likely to be limited to the
employment context. When a person loses out on a job because of such a
stereotype, that loss is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg. Similar
stereotypes are likely to foreclose other jobs and opportunities in society.
A person subject to such a stereotype is therefore likely to face stigmatic
and cumulative disadvantage.
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as” a Black is clearly punitive within the employment context because
of socially ascribed stereotypes. We do not, however, have either the
data or a developed record of social relations to make the same types of
claims for other races and ethnicities.
For example, some of the studies we have analyzed suggest that
Latinos also experience serious disadvantages in access to employment
and housing through proxy discrimination.232 In the structure we have
proposed, the “regarded as” prong attaches remedies only where one can
prove both that the employer has used some proxy for the protected
category and that persons within the relevant category are socially
constructed as undesirable. Thus, we would be able to support claims of
negative social construction for Latinos, and in our post-September 11th
society, the same would likely be true of persons possessing traits that
revealed them to be of Arab descent or Islamic faith.233 However, other
races and ethnicities would be more difficult to adjudge. For instance, in
this Article, we cite to a study indicating that some Asians were
discriminated against in the temporary services employment industry.234
Bagenstos, supra note 193, at 854.
232. See Bendick et al., supra note 14, at 29-31 (reporting that in two separate
sets of study data, Latino tester applicants respectively experienced a twenty percent (UI
study) to twenty-two percent (FEC study) disadvantage in treatment by prospective
employers); Purnell et al., supra note 105, at 14-15 (finding that persons presumed Latino
by voice, for example, those subjects using the Chicano English dialect, received the least
number of appointments to view rental properties, as compared to persons using Standard
American English or African American Vernacular English).
233. Interestingly, at least one federal appeals court has implicitly dealt with the
significance of names and the social construction of identity by ruling that an employer’s
insistence on substituting an American-sounding name in place of an Arab employee’s
ethnic-sounding name was racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
El-Hakem v. BJY, Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2005). While this is not
precisely a proxy discrimination matter, the court recognized how attitudes toward a
name reflect racial bias. See supra note 82. Professor Adrien Katherine Wing has
described the more recent disfavor directed toward Arabs as similar to that Blacks have
historically been subjected to in the United States. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil
Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on
Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 718-21 (2003) (asserting that, post-September 11th, Arabs
“have been socially constructed as ‘Black,’ with the negative legal connotations
historically attributed to that designation. For example, racial profiling, which originated
as a term synonymous with Blacks and police traffic stops, now equally applies to both
Arabs and Muslims in many contexts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Susan M. Akram &
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001:
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN . SURV. AM. L. 295, 299 (2002)
(noting the U.S. Government has recently been subjecting Arabs and Muslims to “[a]
complex matrix of ‘otherness’ based on race, national origin, religion, culture, and
political ideology”); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial
Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV . 1, 2 (2002) (“In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Arab, South Asian, and Muslim Americans have borne the brunt of the
presumptions of foreignness and disloyalty.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1592 (2002) (noting that, after September 11th, even persons of
Arab descent who have been naturalized or were born here were not considered
American citizens “as a matter of identity”).
234. See supra note 82.
50
Also, the Fragante case involved a claimant of Filipino descent, and
Professor Mari Matsuda makes the case that Mr. Fragante and other
Asians may be socially constructed as the undesirable “other” based
upon origin and accent.235 While we accept these claims as authentic,
there is data that suggests that Asians and perhaps Pacific Islanders are
often believed to be an academically superior, socially acceptable,
“model minority.”236 Based on beliefs in this type of positive stereotype,
one might expect Asian names to generate disproportionate positive
interest when they appear on résumés for certain permanent jobs.237
Would this mean employers could claim there would be no harm in being
“regarded as” Asian?238 On the other hand, at least one study suggests
that Asian Americans may be more susceptible to discrimination because
of stereotypes about docility in that employers, in this case temporary
employment agencies, “may believe that they can ignore resumes
submitted by Asian American without fear of a complaint or a civil rights
investigation, which they might more likely receive if they ignored a
member of another ethnic group.”239
That some races are associated with positive social constructions or
stereotypes presents other problems as well. Even where a minority
group is thought to have positive traits, there may be some confusion as
to who is included in the group. Asians, like Latinos, present the
challenge of often being referred to as a monolith when each of these
groups is actually extremely heterogeneous.240 For the purposes of our
235. See Matsuda, supra note 166, at 1384-86, 1392-1401.
236. Many scholars have challenged this myth, which has been described as
follows: “The model minority stereotype posits Asian Americans as uniquely successful
among minority groups. They work hard, save money, and achieve material success,
while their children study equally hard and earn high marks in school.” Shin, supra note
94, at 3; see also Frank H. Wu, Changing America: Three Arguments About Asian
Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U. L. REV . 811, 813-14 (1996).
237. Such a finding would comport with findings in the Figlio study that Asian
children with distinctively Asian names such as “Vivek” were more likely to be referred
to gifted programs and to have higher mathematics test scores than Asian children with
“whiter” names like “Alex.” Figlio, supra note 73, at 19-20.
238. As Frank H. Wu indicates, the problem with the model minority myth is not
only that people ignore that it is, in fact, a myth based upon stereotypes, but also that it is
typically offered as empirical proof or evidence for whatever legal claim is being
advanced. See Wu, supra note 224, at 818-19. Reliance on the myth can, however, be as
dangerous as it is potentially advantageous. Even as one employer might use stereotypes
related to the myth to suggest that Asians will perform certain types of jobs well, the
reverse side of the essentialist ploy is the notion that Asians cannot do well in certain
other types of jobs. At bottom, it is just another version of seeking the “right kind” of
employee that we discussed in the context of the black identity performance at work. See
supra notes 135-43, 149-53 and accompanying text.
239. Names Make a Difference, supra note 82, at 4.
240. See Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious To Their Very Nature”: Asian Americans and
Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 72 n.1 (2001) (stating that experiences of
persons of Japanese and Chinese ancestry are often regarded as synonymous with the
Asian American experience, when actually “[t]here are enormous differences within the
identity category ‘Asian American’ along lines of class, gender, immigration history, and
sexuality, as well as along lines of ancestry”); see also Celious & Oyserman, supra note
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new prong of Title VII jurisprudence, questions will arise from societal
tendencies to interchangeably and simultaneously use race as a reference
to appearance, nationality, ethnicity, and culture.241 Are Chinese,
Korean, and Taiwanese persons “regarded as” the same? Is a Cuban a
Latino? Would an employer be able to defend against a proxy suit
brought by a Thai person where the employer admitted to generally using
proxies to disfavor Asians but asserted as his defense that he did not
consider Thai folks Asian and he “kind of” knew that Thai names did not
sound like most Asian names? How would one handle the claims of a
recent African immigrant who has an African-sounding name? Is the
social construction of African or Caribbean immigrant identity
something separate and different from that of constructions for blackness
as embodied by African Americans?242 The immigrant may identify as
185, at 150-51 (making a similar claim about the heterogeneity of the African American
community).
241. Most of the questions relate to the limited effectiveness of larger “racial”
categories for capturing more nuanced forms of identity affiliation. The following
passage is generally descriptive of the nature of the problem:
The history of discrimination against Mexican-Americans differs from that of
Cuban-Americans, though both groups are lumped together with Puerto
Ricans, Dominicans, Central Americans, and others under the classification
“Hispanic.” Although Haitians are considered black, their status as recent
immigrants and the language barriers they face can separate and exclude
them from more established segments of the African-American community.
Filipinos, though classified as Asians, experienced a unique history of
oppression at the hands of Spanish and American colonialists. Koreans still
resent their country’s historical oppression by Japan. And Japanese and
Chinese cultures and militaries have often clashed. Yet, in the eyes of the
Census Bureau, as well as the courts and legislatures, in implementing race-
conscious remedies, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese are all
classified as “Asian.” An additional accounting problem arises with Latinos
because the Census Bureau classifies this group as an ethnicity, even though
many Latinos are also black or Asian. In other words, the census currently
counts people on the basis of race, but ethnicity transcends race in the case of
Latinos.
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore,
47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 963 (1995).
242. Separate from the name issue, there are questions related to the different
social perceptions that may operate with regard to African or Caribbean immigrants
versus the descendants of slaves in this country. See, e.g., John H. McWhorter, What’s
Holding Blacks Back?, CITY J., Winter 2001, at 24-31 (contrasting the educational failure
of American Blacks to the relative success of the children of African and Caribbean
immigrants as part of his claim that it is American Blacks’ belief in themselves as
victims, rather than racism, that accounts for their lack of success). The black immigrant
divide is often mentioned during discussions of who should benefit from race-based
programs and remedies. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 42, at 13-16 (discussing the
exceptional history of subordination borne by African Americans since the earliest days
of our Republic and why it matters to remedies for discrimination); S. Allen Counter,
Descendants of American Slaves, THE BLACK COLLEGIAN, Feb. 2002 (discussing the
unique debt America owes to the descendants of slaves as opposed to Blacks more
generally, in an article written by a Harvard Medical School neuroscience professor);
Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A1 (discussing the concerns of Professors Lani Guinier and
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., that while eight percent of Harvard’s students were black,
potentially only a third had four grandparents who were born in the United States). The
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black, but does he or she have the same claim as Blacks with African
American-sounding names? Does the employer who sees the African
name on a résumé even use it as a proxy for race?243
The above questions make it clear that, like race in general and
identity politics more specifically, regulating proxy discrimination could
become very complicated. Even so, these types of problems do not make
the “regarded as” standard unworkable. Just like in other cases, the
plaintiff will be responsible for identifying the employer’s impermissible
conduct. The employer then will need to offer a reason for the conduct
premised on something other than direct or proxy discrimination. If at
this point courts then have to make hard choices between strong and
weak evidence of proxies, then these choices are an appropriate
consequence. Again, this process at least forces courts to acknowledge
discrimination as the complex phenomenon it is.
While we accept that proxy discrimination complaints expand the
ambit of Title VII jurisprudence because the potential number of proxies
is substantial and racial categories are typically messy subjects, there can
be some limitations. For instance, although we would provide remedies
to a white Lakisha and Jamal, we would not offer the same to a white
Billy Bob or Peggy Sue, even where their names were also the source of
employment discrimination. Similarly, we would deny these same
persons relief if they were denied employment because of geography,
such as their southern or rural roots, which may also be used as proxies.
These claims could be alleged to be cognizable as race-based because a
person who bypasses a white Billy Bob or someone he believes to be
southern or rural may be acting based upon stereotypes and attempting to
exclude the “wrong type” of white person. In this way, the
discrimination looks somewhat like the exclusion practiced against white
persons with African American-sounding names. The differences,
however, are that the exclusion of whiteness is not the impetus for the
behavior nor is the white race category typically socially constructed as
inferior. The employer avoiding the southern-named or rural-living
white person is making decisions based on socioeconomic background or
perhaps stereotypes based on geographical customs, but not upon race or
another protected Title VII trait. It is this requirement that the claim
implicate a negative social construction of a protected Title VII category
that becomes the limitation on more innovative proxy claims.244
distinction is also prominently discussed within the context of the reparations for slavery
movement. See, e.g., Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of
Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2543-46 (2001).
243. Neither the Bertrand and Mullainathan study nor the Figlio study answers
the question of whether African names, such as Barak Obama, trigger the same type of
discrimination as names such as Lakisha and Jamal.
244. The support for such a claim can be seen by comparing this example to the
findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s research. In that study, African American-
sounding names became proxies for the Blacks whom employers did not wish to hire.
Such a practice resulted in the creation of at least one group that could be described as
consisting of false positives—acceptable job candidates whom are erroneously eliminated
through use of the practice—white (or any nonblack) persons with African American-
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In conclusion, judicial recognition of race-based proxy
discrimination as actionable in hiring discrimination cases would not
only be more effective in remedying race discrimination as it functions
on the job market for applicants, but also would help to deter such
discrimination by forcing employers to pay for any decisions that rest on
proxies for race. Moreover, it would further the purposes of Title VII by
creating a space in which insiders or members of the dominant racial
group can be compensated for discrimination against them when they too
are perceived as racial minorities and “disabled” or lacking in ability
because of their racial status. In the same way that the socially
constructed racial meanings or proxies, such as name or voice, underlie
discrimination against minorities based on signals of race, they also
enable discrimination against majority members, not only because of
such signals, but also based on their views, which may, according to
social definitions, be considered as thinking too much like a racial
minority, along with any attendant negative stereotypes. Indeed, this
expanded understanding of Title VII case law will only work to further
the goals of Title VII and to effectuate the intent of its drafters, who
certainly understood, as so many of us do, that it is not physical race
itself that is damaging, but the social meanings that are attached to race
that are dangerous and must be eradicated.245
sounding names. One could argue that Blacks who did not conform to the behavioral
conventions that the employers thought the names signified are also false positives, but
this is less clear because it may just be that only the disfavored name (African American-
sounding) combined with the disfavored race (Blacks) was needed to satisfy the
unacceptable choice (any African American-named Black). We have essentially argued
that false positives like the white Jamal and Lakisha should receive Title VII protection
because their exclusion is also based on race in that the choice to exclude them is
premised upon negative social understandings of blackness. In the Billy Bob example,
however, where is the false positive? There does not appear to be one because the
employer is trying to exclude all applicants with the name, not Blacks or Whites in
particular. In this example, the black Billy Bob would be without Title VII remedy just
like the white Billy Bob because stilted racial constructions are not the impetus for the
behavior. This, of course, presents a paradox that will have to be dealt with on an ad hoc
basis within proxy cases. In the case of African American-sounding names, an employer
treating all similarly named persons the same tends to prove the power of the racist
construction in effect. Treating all applicants the same in other contexts, however, may
serve to prove there was no unlawful discrimination present. In other words, intentions
really do matter for this type of disparate intent claim.
245. At a minimum, we believe that Congress should make this understanding of
racial discrimination explicit by adding the “regarded as” language to Title VII legislation
concerning racial discrimination.
